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FOREWORD
At times, an institution needs to examine itself and take
stock of its future. The “Army” writ large as an institution is,
above all, an assembly of people—all with a common bond
and task. This book deals with the vital question of how the
United States armed forces in general, and the Army as an
institution in particular, can best accommodate in their
recruiting efforts the rapid changes in U.S. population
patterns over the next half century. It is an effort at
self-examination. The book is an outgrowth of convergent
initiatives on the part of two American educational
institutions—the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle
Barracks, Pennsylvania, and Spelman College in Atlanta,
Georgia—the two having formed a fruitful partnership to
co-sponsor a conference titled “Population Diversity and the
U.S. Army in 2030,” held at Spelman College on August 7,
1998.
The Army War College, through its Strategic Outreach
Program, makes a concerted effort to connect with various
American civilian entities not only to promote mutual
understanding, but also to find collaborative solutions for
military problems that ultimately affect all Americans.
Spelman College, positioned at the core of the network of
historically black colleges in Atlanta and having a student
body of black women, provided an ideal venue for examining
issues regarding demographic and ethnic change that we
expect in America over the next several decades. We should
acknowledge as well the yeoman assistance of the U.S.
Army Recruiting Command located at Fort Knox,
Kentucky, which provided to conferees useful briefings
wholly devoid of academic vapors, focusing rather upon the
unvarnished realities of future projections of the
composition of America’s population. Our Recruiting
Command colleagues also discussed in clear terms the
Army’s efforts to enlist women and members of other
diverse groups in the recruiting market of today—and what
we can expect tomorrow.
v

This book is not intended as a transcript of all conference
proceedings. Rather, it is an anthology of selected
presentations that not only portrays the main challenges
confronting those who must staff the future force in the face
of unprecedented demographic flux, but also provides the
attitudes and hopes of women and minorities who are part
of today’s Army.
The reader should pay particular attention to Chapter 2,
which examines the Russian military. Its author, Robert
Pringle, gives us a case study in what happens when an
institution collapses because it can not accommodate
diversity and change.

LARRY M. WORTZEL
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION:
PRIMER ON FUTURE RECRUIT DIVERSITY
Lloyd J. Matthews
If we do not learn from history, we shall be compelled to relive
it. True. But if we do not change the future, we shall be
compelled to endure it. And that could be worse.
Alvin Toffler1

The premises of this monograph are that an
epoch-defining demographic ferment is in progress in the
United States today, that this ferment will produce
fundamental changes in the composition of the Army, and
that the Army must adapt to such changes with great
wisdom if the emotion-laden issues evoked at every turn are
not to stymie the muster of an optimum ground force over
the next several decades.
Evidence of demographic flux is everywhere, in popular
literature as well as the Census Bureau’s official
projections. Consider, for example, the eye-popping
projection that Americans of European background, now
comprising about 72 percent of the U.S. population, will
diminish to about 53 percent by the year 2050, meaning that
so-called “white Anglo-Saxons” are headed for minority
status. The fastest-growing ethnic group is those of
Hispanic origin, who if current trends hold will comprise
one-quarter of the population by mid-century.2 Though
Nation of Islam leader Louis Farrakhan once avowed that
“with our increased birthrates the black man and woman
can actually breed ourselves into power,” 3 the likelihood
rather is that as early as the year 2008, Hispanics, now
numbering 30.5 million, will have eclipsed blacks and form
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the largest minority in the country. Writer Tad Szulc makes
an even stronger claim:
Hispanics already constitute the largest single ethnic and
cultural minority in the U.S., contrary to Census Bureau
figures, which do not include more than 4 million Hispanics
living here illegally, as well as the nearly 4 million Puerto
Ricans on their island. This puts their numbers above those of
African-Americans. With 600,000 new immigrants a
year—about half of them illegal—Hispanics will reach 50
million [by 2005].4

Another American ethnic group experiencing a rapid
increase in its numbers is the Asian and Pacific Islander
populations, now constituting less than four percent of U.S.
citizens but expected to reach 8.2 percent by mid-century.
Blacks, currently numbering about 12.2 percent, are
projected to remain relatively steady at 13.6 percent over
that same period.
But ethnicity and race are not the only population
variables that can bear on the composition of an
army—gender, sexual orientation, and religion, to name a
few others that spring most prominently to mind—are
obviously relevant.5 Women are knocking at the door of the
armed forces in growing numbers. Females slightly
outnumber males in the U.S. population, and they are
gradually exercising ballot clout and employment options
more proportionate to their numbers. As an example,
January 1999 saw the swearing in of the top five elected
state officials in Arizona who were all women! Meanwhile,
Elizabeth Dole ponders a run for the Republican
presidential nomination.
Homosexuals are also demanding access to military
careers, and while their relative numbers may not be
increasing their militance is. The current “don’t ask, don’t
tell” policy—a middle path between outright rejection of
homosexuals on one hand, and total acceptance on the
other—was ruled constitutional by the 2d U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals in New York on September 23, 1998.6
2

Further, at the time of publication of this monograph,
homosexuals were not classified as a minority group
deserving of special civil rights protection. But no
knowledgeable observer expects this to be the last gavel
sounded on the issue.
Meanwhile, a survey among soldiers conducted by
Charles Moskos and Laura Miller suggested that internal
resistance to homosexuals in the military may be softening.
Of 270 male soldiers surveyed, only 36 percent were
“strongly opposed,” with 22 percent “not sure.” Women
favored accepting homosexuals by better than two to one.7
The survey samples were smallish and not selected
scientifically, but if the numbers hold up they could be
important since one of the arguments against homosexuals
in the military rests on the assumption that they would be
rejected by heterosexual comrades in the ranks,
jeopardizing unit cohesion.
On the religious front, the number of faiths represented
among service members has grown well beyond the
traditional “Big Three”—Protestant, Catholic, Jewish.8 The
Buddhist Churches of America became the first
non-Judeo-Christian chaplaincy endorsing agency in 1987.9
By 1989, more than 100 religious denominations were
represented among active duty Army chaplains.10 In 1992,
Chaplain Abdul R. Muhammad became the first Islamic
chaplain on active duty, and we are now seeing the
establishment of “mosques” on some Army posts, e.g., Fort
Bragg, North Carolina, where Muslim soldiers can worship
in appropriate facilities.11 By 1994, there were 1,400
Muslims and 1,240 Buddhists in the Total Army, numbers
that showed every promise of growing.12
The upshot of the foregoing discussion is that as the
tectonic plates comprising the U.S. population continue to
shift, there will be inevitable reflections of these changes in
the Army’s composition. To acquire richer diversity in
human capital can bring with it enormous advantages for
any country or institution, as the American immigrant
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experience in the 19th and early-20th centuries so clearly
demonstrated. But the process of acquiring that diversity
can be unsettling at best and explosively controversial at
worst. This is why intelligent planning and wise
management become so critical for the Army during its
encounter with growing recruit diversity over the next
several decades. We can glimpse the nature of the problem
by reference to several examples.
In the best of all possible worlds, ethnic representation
within the Army should reflect at least roughly the ethnic
proportions of the general population. When these
proportions are seriously out of whack or are perceived to be
so, particularly in combat units during wartime, the
“cannon-fodder” allegation inevitably arises. Complaints
were registered during both the Vietnam and Persian Gulf
wars that poor blacks bore a disproportionate share of the
combat risks. African-American leaders Jesse Jackson and
Benjamin Hooks, for example, protested that U.S. Army
forces sent to the Gulf were 30 percent black, whereas the
U.S. population was only 11 percent black. After the Gulf
War, Professor Ronald Walters of the Howard University
faculty recommended binding quotas limiting blacks in the
military to their proportion of the population at large.13
In fact, however, as Charles Moskos and John Sibley
Butler have pointed out, in the Vietnam War black fatalities
came to only 12.1 percent of the total for all Americans, a
percentage corresponding almost exactly to the percentage
of blacks in the general population and far below the
percentage of blacks in the military at that time. Going
further, Moskos and Butler collected data on combat deaths
by race in seven U.S. overseas interventions since
Vietnam—Mayaguez (Cambodia), Lebanon, Grenada,
Panama, the Persian Gulf, Somalia, and Bosnia. Blacks
accounted for only 14 percent of the U.S. combat fatalities.
Moskos and Butler conclude: “No serious case can be made
that African-Americans suffer disproportionate casualties
in America’s wars and interventions.”14
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The Army cannot afford to be complacent over the
foregoing analysis, however, since the subject of
comparative ethnic shares of combat risk remains so
extraordinarily sensitive—thus ever vulnerable to
demagoguery—and since combat risk projections by ethnic
leaders and opinion-makers are usually based (not
unnaturally) upon ethnic representation in the total force
rather than in frontline combat units. Ironically, according
to Moskos and Butler, the percentage of blacks in the
infantry has dropped steadily from 30 percent in 1980 to 15
percent currently, while the portion of blacks in logistics
units today often runs in excess of 50 percent. Moskos and
Butler believe that “the reasons for and consequences of this
development require attention.”15 The lesson for the Army
is clear: as the Hispanic share of the U.S. population climbs
toward 25 percent by the middle of the next century, a figure
double that of blacks, a correspondingly rising share of
Hispanics is likely to find its way into the Army’s ranks. If
this development is not managed with care, the same
cannon-fodder charges that have dogged the Army with
respect to blacks could begin to emerge with respect to
Hispanics.
Nor do causes for concern cease here. Linda Chavez,
president of the Center for Equal Opportunity in
Washington and author of Out of the Barrio: Toward a New
Politics of Assimilation (Basic Books), has reported on an
episode in Los Angeles in February 1998 that could well
represent a premonitory microcosm of larger movements in
the future:
A crowd of over 91,000 fans, made up predominantly of
Latinos who live and work in southern California, gathered for
the Gold Cup soccer match between the Mexican and U.S.
national teams. They did not come to root for the home team.
Rather, they booed and whistled through the singing of The
Star Spangled Banner, and then proceeded to pelt the players
on the American team with food, bottles, and cans. . . . A
Mexican-American fan complained bitterly that he and his
young son had been sprayed with beer and soda for having the
temerity to display a small American flag. . . . Dozens of . . .
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letter-writers expressed their disgust with Hispanic
immigrants who were happy to take advantage of American
jobs, education, medical care, and welfare benefits while
spitting on American symbols.16

In graphic language, Mrs. Chavez has broached one of
the most sensitive but crucial questions arising from the
Hispanic immigration movement: Will Hispanics,
particularly those of Mexican ancestry who reside in the belt
of southwestern U.S. border states contiguous to Mexico,
assimilate into the American melting pot like other ethnic
groups, or will they instead remain a separate community
within a community, maintaining their original language,
identity, culture, and national loyalty?
Mrs. Chavez feels that prospects for assimilation are
poor, noting the low rates of naturalization (“even after
nearly 20 years of U.S. residence, it seems that fewer than
one in five Mexican-Americans chooses to acquire American
citizenship”) and the resistance to learning English (“as of
1990, three-quarters of Mexican immigrants who arrived in
the 1980s still spoke little or no English; about one quarter
of all Mexican immigrants have not learned to speak
English even after decades in the U.S.”).17 Tad Szulc, in
comparison, takes a more upbeat view of the Hispanic
community-within-community approach to life in the
United States:
The Ramoses [for example] are a proud Mexican-American
family, participating fully in American life without
relinquishing their Mexican identity. In many ways, their story
reflects that of other Hispanics across the U.S. The ability to
come to terms with two identities is perhaps the secret of the
rich Hispanic culture that has taken root in this country. . . .
Ultimately, the Spanish language is the great unifier of the rich
and disparate Hispanic culture. And that culture—in all its
vibrant accents and through its music, food, literature, and
political concerns—is braiding itself into the diverse American
fabric and becoming, at the advent of the 21st century, a new
American culture.18
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The sentiment expressed above, which evokes the
multiculturist movement that has taken hold in American
education over the past quarter of a century, is by no means
shared by all. No less an observer than Arthur Schlesinger,
Jr., who has always marched in the vanguard of the civil
rights movement in this country, in a 1992 book disagreed
with the view “that a main objective of public education
should be the protection, strengthening, celebration, and
perpetuation” of different ethnic identities.19 If the “cult of
ethnicity” ever became fully ascendant in this country, it
could in Schlesinger’s view threaten the unity, cohesion,
and identity that define us as a nation.
Fortunately, we need not enter this great national
debate except to note its implications for recruiting the
future Army. Two points are salient. First, the level of
English language fluency among the Hispanic 18-24 age
cohort could impair our ability to make full use of this
growing segment of the U.S. population. As the Information
Age comes fully into view, the U.S. Army will become a
communicating army like no army before it, and it will
require soldiers who write and speak a common language.
Lacking such facility, soldiers would be unable to transact
with fellow soldiers in the elementary grammar of war, and
they could be unable to capitalize upon the technological
manna that daily descends upon the forces. Those
responsible for raising and training the Army After Next
will need to give the language question a great deal of hard
thought.
Second, despite the possibility that language could pose
problems for the incorporation of Hispanic youth in national
defense, it seems nonetheless inevitable that the sheer
numbers in the recruiting pool will make themselves felt
and that some units in the Army might eventually
experience Hispanic representation on the order of 20 to 40
percent, the largest share of which could be of Mexican
derivation.20 A hint of things to come can be seen in the
Army’s accession figures for Hispanics since FY 1985,
showing a steady annual rise from 3.5 percent to about 10
7

percent today.21 We earlier glanced at the likelihood of
“cannon-fodder” charges when casualty figures of particular
ethnic groups are perceived to grow significantly out of line.
Of course, the problems presented by recruit diversity
are not exclusively ethnic. Gender integration has brought
its own distinct set of problems, and, if anything, the
resulting dialogue has been marked by far more heat and
acrimony than has ethnic discussion. Jean Holm, who has
written perhaps the best and most evenhanded brief history
of women in the armed forces, here describes the
deliberations of the blue-ribbon, 15-member Presidential
Commission on Women’s Assignments, which rendered its
report in November 1992:
Almost from the outset the commission’s meetings were
contentious and combative. Discussions frequently degenerated
into rancorous debate . . . . Each [side] accused the other of closed
minds and bad faith. . . . The report . . . was described by many as
a partisan mess and, as expected, stirred up a firestorm of
criticism.22

But what precisely is the nub of the controversy today?
All statutory combat exclusions affecting women have been
repealed. By policy, women are permitted to compete for
assignments in aircraft, including those engaged in combat
missions. They are permitted assignment to ships on
combat missions.23 The main remaining policy bar to
combat participation by women lies in the directive that
they not be assigned “to units engaged in direct combat on
the ground,”24 which ostensibly would prohibit assignments
to infantry, armor, cavalry, artillery, and combat engineers,
though the de facto prohibitions will likely be subject to
evolving interpretation.
The story of the gradual opening of military assignments
to women is the story of continual unyielding pressure by
sincere female service members and their advocates to
secure as many openings as possible, with the ultimate goal
of abolishing all exclusions. Meanwhile, many sincere male
service members and their advocates, motivated by the
8

conviction that women are generally less fit for combat than
men, argue that assignments should reflect this distinction.
I have tried to flesh out the positions of the two camps with
the narratives below, which are intentionally expressed in
tones of dogmatic certitude.
According to the “Traditionalist” argument, the most
powerful chemical warfare agent known to science is
testosterone, the vital masculinizing hormone produced
primarily by males. It is responsible for the size, strength,
and aggressiveness that distinguish the male from the
female. All other factors being equal, a male army will
defeat a female army. All other factors being equal, a male
army will defeat a coed army. If two male armies fight, the
victor will be the one with the least feminizing
acculturation, all other factors being equal. If, in the name
of equal rights or equal economic opportunity, government
selects the less fit to fight its wars, it betrays its sacred trust
to protect the people and preserve the nation.
The Feminist 2 5 responds that war is no longer
epitomized by individual soldiers engaged in hand-to-hand
combat, where victory goes to the combatant with more
physical prowess and brawn. War instead has become a
corporate endeavor, fought by complex organizations at
great distances, employing technology to locate the enemy
and advanced weaponry to destroy him. In place of soldiers
who are big, fast, strong, and fierce, the Army of the future
will require those who are smart, educated, technically
trainable, and able to work compatibly as members of a
team, traits a woman can supply as well and perhaps better
than a man. In modern warfare, soldiers seldom lay eyes on
an actual enemy, instead relying on sensors to find him and
stand-off weapons to destroy him. A woman can operate
sensing devices and activate automated weapons as well as
a man. Defending one’s country is at once a right, a
privilege, and an obligation, accruing under the
Constitution to women as well as men. Our country is far
better served by a willing female soldier than a reluctant
male. Even if it were demonstrable that some few positions
9

must be reserved for the brute male, the vast majority of
roles can be satisfactorily performed by females. In the final
analysis, the argument is moot because the realities of the
recruiting market in the era of the all-volunteer force will
dictate an increasing share of women in the Army.
As we progress into the new century, we can expect the
tension between the Traditionalist and Feminist positions
on women’s assignments to be played out against the
backdrop of continued evolution in the technology and
methods of warfare, fluctuations in the military budget and
manpower ceilings as dictated by Congress, national
economic conditions, and variations in the size, quality, and
attitudes of the available manpower--and womanpower-pool. Over the last 15 years, the proportion of women in the
Army has risen continuously; today one in every five
soldiers inducted is female.26
Except for judicial tests in the nation’s higher courts,
controversy with respect to homosexuals in the military has
been generally muted since implementation of the “don’t
ask, don’t tell, don’t pursue” policy in July 1993. In
September of the same year, Congress inserted a clause in
the National Defense Authorization Act that could make it
harder for presidents in the future to relax the present
policy, which requires discharge of any military member
who engages in a homosexual act. The clause inserted by
Congress declares that “persons who demonstrate a
propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts would
create an unacceptable risk to the high standards of morale,
good order and discipline.”27
During the national debates in 1992-93 leading up to the
“don’t ask, don’t tell, don’t pursue” policy, homosexual
advocates sought to draw an analogy between the
predicament of homosexuals at that time and the
predicament of blacks seeking full integration into the
armed forces in 1948. Just as charges that the integration of
blacks into the ranks would destroy unit cohesion proved
false, according to homosexual proponents, similar fears
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about the inclusion of homosexuals would prove false.
However, General Colin Powell and Lieutenant General
Calvin Waller, both prominent black officers, expressed
disagreement with such an analogy. Testifying before the
Senate Armed Services Committee on April 29, 1993, for
example, General Waller pointed out that blacks cannot
change or conceal the blackness for which they suffer
discrimination. By way of contrast, according to Waller,
homosexuals can change or conceal their homosexual
behavior, a fact that renders the African-American
experience entirely different.28
Because of the silence imposed by the “don’t ask, don’t
tell” policy, we cannot be sure how many homosexuals are
entering the Army under the resulting umbrella. The
formulation does represent a liberalization of pre-1993
policy, however, in the sense that homosexual soldiers can
expect a reduced threat of exposure, meaning that their
numbers may well increase in the future force.29
Turning to the subject of religious diversity, we find that
the proliferation of faiths represented in the Army can
potentially present special problems in terms of
requirements for distinctive, religion-imposed apparel,
uniform accoutrements, diet, medical needs, times of duty,
and hair length and grooming, as well as for faith-specific
worship facilities.30 The yarmulke for Conservative Jewish
male soldiers and the turban, beard, and other
particularities for Sikhs are examples of issues encountered
in the past. To codify policy in this area, the Army
promulgated AR 600-20, Accommodation of Religious
Practices Within the U.S. Army, in 1986.31 The current
version of the regulation notes that “a complete prohibition
on the wearing of any visible item of religious apparel may
be appropriate under unique circumstances,” but the
commander is allowed to make the final decision.32 In
practice thus far, commanders have construed the
regulation liberally and the issue has generated little
controversy in the ranks.33 Potential for controversy always
lies just beneath the surface, however, particularly if issues
11

are seized upon by outside agitators and politicized through
the news media.
In the two chapters that immediately follow, we will
locate the recruit diversity phenomenon within the broad
context of civil-military relations, since such relations can
be decisive in the Army’s efforts to raise an optimum force in
the face of a radically changing recruitment pool.
Subsequent chapters will focus primarily upon the ethnic
aspects of diversity, because it is in this area that the
greatest changes from patterns of the past are likely to
occur.
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CHAPTER 2
THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE AND THEIR ARMY:
A NEGATIVE EXAMPLE FOR AMERICA
Robert Pringle
INTRODUCTION
Discussion of diversity issues affecting an army usually
arises within the larger context of the relations between
that army and the civilian population of the nation involved.
If we are truly to understand how diversity considerations
affect an army, whether for better or worse, we must first
gain some appreciation of the society from which soldiers
are drawn. Society’s attitude toward the military,
particularly insofar as that attitude is reflected in the views
of potential recruits, can be a decisive factor not only in
recruiting a quality force, but also in maintaining the
morale and viability of the force once it is raised.
Unfortunately, contemplation of diversity issues facing
the U.S. army today, not to mention the high-tempo
operational uses and commitments of its soldiers in this
still-dangerous world, is a subject overladen with strong
feelings. Questions of ethnic and gender equity, to which are
superadded questions of placing our children in harm’s way,
form an extraordinarily emotive brew, and it is most
difficult to discern the path of wisdom when emotions
become engaged.
At such times, to regain our analytical detachment, it
can be helpful to shift our scrutiny to a competing model, one
that is emotively neutral but yet sufficiently analogous to
our own to be instructive. For this purpose, we shall
examine the situation in Russia, where the army and the
people have come to the point of undisguised mutual
hostility. Armed with a perspective of events in Russia, we
17

shall be better prepared to view the situation in our own
country in a more dispassionate light.
HISTORICAL HERITAGE
During the heyday of the Soviet Union, three
institutions constituted the political troika on which power
was based: the Communist Party, the Committee of State
Security (KGB), and the Red army. Of these three, the army
had the greatest legitimacy and enjoyed the most popular
support. If, in the eyes of the people, the Party and the KGB
represented the authority and the power, the army was of
the people themselves. How was it possible, then, for it to
have lost standing so rapidly during the waning days of the
Cold War and in post-Cold War democratic Russia?
Ties between the people and the Red army were
cemented by the terrible cost of victory in what Soviet
citizens called the “Great Patriotic War.” More than 25
million members of the Soviet armed forces were killed or
wounded in the war against Nazi Germany.1 To put these
losses into perspective, the Red army in 1941 lost almost
twice as many men killed in the 10-week defense of
Moscow—514,338—than the United States lost in combat
in all of World War II.2 The war created a set of genuinely
popular uniformed heroes seemingly untouched by the
horrors of the Stalin terror.
During the post-Stalin period, the Party and the
Ministry of Defense further publicized the cult of victory to
enhance the regime’s legitimacy. Victory Day on May 9
became one of the most important and most popular annual
holidays. Military art became a major state industry; for
example, statues from Volgograd to Berlin celebrated the
role of the Soviet soldier and officer in defending the
motherland and “liberating” the countries of Eastern
Europe.3
During the Brezhnev years (1964-82), the Soviet armed
forces continued to be the subject of uncritical adulation.
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Mandatory military service was seen as a “school of life,”
integral to becoming a man. Thousands of books, articles,
poems, plays, and movies highlighted the role of the
military in defeating the German Fascists and defending
the country against imperialism. Children’s books
celebrated the brave border guards and soldiers, while
Brezhnev’s memoirs of the war embroidered his own role as
a brigade political commissar in fighting the Nazis.4
Brezhnev’s book sold millions of copies, as did memoirs by
other leaders.
Beneath the surface, however, there was evidence of
growing popular discontent within society and the military
itself with regard to the regime’s management of the armed
forces. Stories of the mistreatment of draftees circulated in
the press. Of greater concern to the leadership was the
participation of junior army and naval officers in dissident
movements and in at least two acts of political violence—an
attempt against the life of Brezhnev in 1969 and the
hijacking of a destroyer by several junior officers in 1975.5
Even Brezhnev’s overblown military reputation became the
butt of underground political humor. In one joke, Stalin,
during a particularly difficult moment in the war, invites
Brigade Commander Brezhnev to the Kremlin to ask him
how to defeat the Wehrmacht.
CRACKS IN THE EDIFICE
General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev came to power
only weeks after the 40th anniversary of the Nazis’
surrender. His speech on Victory Day 1985 extolled the role
of the Red army and the Party’s leadership in defeating
Germany. Nevertheless, it was Gorbachev’s policy of
glasnost (openness) that legitimized criticism of the
military, especially in the handling of draftees and the
conduct of the war in Afghanistan. By the 1980s, the deaths
of thousands of draftees because of hazing had become one
of the dirty little secrets of Soviet society. Articles in the
press beginning in 1988 reported how nasty and brutal life
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was for the average recruit, and how the army permitted
violence against new draftees that annually killed or drove
thousands to commit suicide. The war in Afghanistan,
which Gorbachev described as a “bleeding wound” in a
speech to the Communist Party conference, had become
unpopular by 1986. Families resented sending their
children “there”—that is, to Afghanistan. Press reports of
how poorly the army honored their dead, how the children of
the privileged class were spared duty in Afghanistan, and
how blunders cost draftees their lives, colored public
perceptions of the armed forces.
The rediscovery of Soviet history, another aspect of
glasnost, led to a further reduction of the moral authority of
the army. Books and articles based on declassified
information about the Great Patriotic War raised questions
about military brutality and mismanagement. For the first
time, World War II military orders were made public that
equated being taken prisoner with treason, stipulating that
families of prisoners of war would suffer dire consequences.
As a veteran of the partisan movement put it in assessing
the cost of victory, “In paying an immense price for the
victory over Hitler, the people facilitated the complete
victory of Stalin’s absolute tyranny.” 6
It was Gorbachev’s decision to use the military to contain
and suppress nationalist violence, however, that did the
most damage to the military’s crumbling reputation.
Alexander Lebed, earlier an airborne regimental and
division commander, noted in his memoirs that the use of
elite airborne divisions to police nationalist disturbances in
Azerbaijan, Armenia, Central Asia, and the Baltic
exacerbated ethnic tensions throughout the military, and
created a growing rift between the army and society (let
America pay heed). Writing of the impact first of the Afghan
War and then of political intervention, Lebed wrote:
This incompetent political adventure, this attempt to export our
revolution, which had not justified itself, spelled the beginning
of the end. In 1986 Alma-Ata caught fire, and then Karabakh,
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Fergana, Georgia, Tajikistan . . . and on it spread. The number
of those killed and wounded on Soviet Union territory has long
since outstripped the number killed on Afghan soil.7

YELTSIN’S RUSSIA, WHOSE ARMY?
In December 1991, Russia’s new president, Boris
Yeltsin, inherited a world-class army that had been badly
compromised during the final days of the Soviet regime.
Elite airborne regiments had been rushed to Moscow to take
part in the abortive August 1991 coup, and we now know
that violence was only narrowly averted on several
occasions.8 Moreover, Yeltsin, who had no active-duty
military experience, selected an airborne commander,
General Pavel Grachev, to head the Ministry of Defense
based on the sole qualification that he had not supported the
August coup that would have restored the Soviet old guard.9
It is therefore hardly surprising that efforts by Yeltsin to
manage the Russian army have been unsuccessful and have
broadened the gap between the army and society into an
abyss. In attempting to understand the army’s loss of
legitimacy, we shall discuss in turn the following four
interrelated issues: the failure of military reform; military
corruption; hazing; and the war in Chechnya.
The Failure of Military Reform.
During his battles with Communist Party chief
Gorbachev, Yeltsin had called for a reformed, apolitical
Russian military establishment. While these demands
played well in the reformist Moscow media (and the West),
Yeltsin quickly demonstrated on taking power that he had
little idea of how to implement reform of the military
establishment. The military budget was repeatedly slashed,
but little effort was made to reduce the size of the officer
corps, restructure the components of the Ministry of
Defense, or redefine the mission of the Russian army.
During the Soviet period, the armed forces had become
top-heavy. Russian journalists with ties to the military
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estimated that the Russian armed forces had four times as
many flag officers as the American, far in excess of what the
relative sizes of the two forces would have justified.
Gorbachev made no effort to control the perks of the officer
corps in the late 1980s, but rather accepted military
privilege as natural, much like the political benefits enjoyed
by the Party elite. Yeltsin has chosen to manage the armed
forces as a benevolent, if distant, administrator. Loyalty
rather than competence has been rewarded. Two ministers
of defense have been dismissed as well as a chief of the
general staff and other senior officers. The Russian
president, however, has systematically refused to appoint a
civilian minister of defense, preferring to divide power
between political appointees in the National Security
Council and military officers on the general staff. In doing
this, Yeltsin has demonstrated a preference to see power
remain divided between powerful subordinates rather than
initiate real reform.
Yeltsin has made no effort to restructure the officer
corps. Rather than turning to a civilian minister of defense,
Yeltsin has allowed a general staff that was socialized,
promoted, and rewarded by the Soviet system to manage the
transition from the Soviet era to democracy. It turned out to
be the critical error. While the high command was markedly
successful in managing its stockpile of nuclear weapons, it
failed to cope with myriad problems associated with the end
of the Cold War.
Restructuring of the forces has also fallen on hard times.
The armed forces of the Soviet Union were concentrated in
three competing bureaucracies. While the Ministry of
Defense was responsible for the lion’s share of personnel,
more than 400,000 soldiers served in the Internal Troops of
the Ministry of Interior and the Chief Directorate of Border
Guards of the KGB. Moreover, the Defense Ministry was
divided into five major components, each with its own
installations, staffs, and military schools. In all, the
Ministry of Defense had more than 100 schools training
junior officers. It would have taken a platoon of military
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Solomons to restructure the new Russian armed forces in a
time of rapidly declining financial support, but none were
readily available.
Attempts at restructuring since 1992 have led to chaos,
not order. Today, more than a dozen separate Russian
government organizations have their own armed forces.
Besides the Ministry of Defense, these include the Ministry
of Interior, the Federal Security Service, the Presidential
Security Organization, the Main Security Directorate, and
the Directorate of Emergency Services. According to a
senior defense ministry official, these other armed forces
“are bigger than the army and the fleet,” continuing to grow
while the Defense Ministry faces severe financial
problems.10
With the end of the Cold War and the decamping of the
Soviet republics, the Russian soldier lost not only much of
his “motherland” but lost his historical national mission as
well. New political developments raised questions as to who
was a Russian soldier, and what exactly was he to defend.
Was a man with a Ukrainian surname, born in Georgia of a
Russian mother and a Jewish father, a Russian? (A recent
Russian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister have exactly
that lineage.) If NATO, the United States, or China was no
longer the enemy, who or what was?
More important, politicization of the armed forces has
intensified during the post-Soviet period. A noted Russian
military correspondent wrote that Yeltsin’s notion of
civilian control of the military is that he alone shall exercise
such control lest someone else develop a power base.11 Army
troops have been used on several occasions since 1991 to
quell internal unrest—traditionally the responsibility of the
Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. For
example, in October 1993, Yeltsin used troops from the elite
2nd Guards Infantry and 4th Guards Armor Divisions to
quash a parliamentary revolt. Tank and small arms fire set
the government building on fire, and in the following fight
more than 150 Russian soldiers and civilians were killed.
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Then, in June 1995, 4,000 paratroopers from the elite 98th
and 106th Airborne Divisions were deployed to Moscow to
help the city police operate against suspected Chechen
terrorism.12
Military Corruption.
Limited anecdotal evidence suggests that corruption
had begun to be a problem for the Soviet army in the 1980s.
According to one military joke, a senior military officer is
asked, “Why can’t the children of generals become
marshals?” The answer: “Well, the marshals have children,
too.” During the 1980s, senior military officers commonly
built luxurious dachas in the Moscow environs using
military money and military labor. Other military
commanders leased their units to both Party officials and
underground millionaires for everything from home
building to guard services.
During the last years of the Gorbachev regime, stories of
military corruption began to percolate through the press.
Then after Yeltsin came to power, this stream of stories
became a flood. Accounts appeared in the press of military
corruption involving senior officers in Moscow. Following a
story involving corruption in the Ministry of Defense, an
intrepid reporter was killed by a sophisticated bomb hidden
in a briefcase. The Russian media reported rumors that the
bomb had been placed by senior GRU (Military Intelligence)
officers on the order of General Pavel Grachev.
Efforts to stem military corruption by the police and
military have largely failed, and it remains a public scandal
further undermining the Russian army’s relationship with
society. According to reports in the Russian media, food for
garrisons in the Russian Far East has been sold by senior
officers. As a result, there has been malnutrition and at
least one case of starvation in troop units.
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Hazing.
By 1990, draft evasion had become a major problem for
the Soviet army. According to all sources, the major reason
for evasion and desertion was hazing. In the last days of the
Soviet regime, organizations such as Shield and Soldiers’
Mothers were organized to protect the rights of servicemen,
and their work intensified public concern about the
treatment of conscripts.
The Yeltsin regime has made no effort to cope with the
hazing problem. Information from voluntary organizations,
the media, and parliamentary investigations indicate that
the problem continues throughout the armed forces. An
investigation by the Duma found that during a recent
28-month period, more than 2,500 Russian servicemen
committed suicide, most of them presumably owing to
hazing.13 Even in elite units such as the Dzerzhinskiy
Division, hazing is tolerated and encouraged. A Russian
human rights commission found that 100 soldiers had
suffered severe trauma and injuries from such treatment.14
The impact of hazing on society’s perception of the
military has been drastically negative. Draft-dodging has
become commonplace. The army admitted in March 1998
that 70,000 youths avoided conscription the previous year,
and that 40,000 deserters were on the run. Surveys of the
Russian media show growing disrespect for the profession of
arms and military service. According to a military
correspondent, there is an acute shortage of junior officers
in the army today as thousands of lieutenants and captains
have recently resigned.15
The War in Chechnya.
For many Russians the Chechen War, waged between
Moscow and the tiny breakaway republic from December
1994 to August 1996, was an epiphany. The failure of the
military to win a decisive victory against the rebels, the
highly visible military incompetence, and its brutal
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disregard of civilian casualties as well as its disrespect for
its own dead signaled that the army was no longer of the
people.
Despite the claim by Grachev that the Chechen capital
Grozny could be taken by an armored regiment in a single
morning, it took elements of several divisions weeks to
capture the city. According to Western and Russian
journalists on the scene, Chechen rebels killed over 1,500
Russian soldiers on the war’s first day as they sought to
fight their way into the Chechen capital. In the fighting in
Grozny and other Chechen cities, artillery, armor, and
helicopter gunships were used against heavily populated
centers—including areas inhabited by Russians. Russian
commanders made little effort to retrieve the bodies of their
own soldiers and return them to their families. There was
little or no effort to locate or identify Russian dead or 1,900
missing on the Chechen battlefield.16
THE “NATIONALITIES” PROBLEM
The USSR was a multinational state encompassing well
over a 100 ethnic groups. It was the only world power in
which the ascendant nationality—in its case, the
Russians—barely held a majority. Despite their long
attempts at Russification, the Soviets were never able to
extinguish the flame of nationalism among the main ethnic
minorities. 17 Though the Russian language was supposed to
be the lingua franca of the Soviet Union, the percentage of
members of the main ethnic groups claiming Russian as a
mother tongue remained minuscule for the most part, while
even the percentage of those claiming fluency in Russian as
a second language remained surprisingly low.
In 1970, for example, the figures for Ukrainians were
14.2 percent and 36.3 percent, respectively, meaning that
nearly 50 percent lacked fluency in the official language of
the Soviet Union. So far as ethnic minorities further
removed from the European center were concerned, the
situation was even more dismal.18 With a population so
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heterogeneous in so many ways, the Soviets were never able
to assimilate the nationalities into a unified, fully
integrated body politic.
The collapse of the Moscow coup in August 1991 set in
motion forces of disintegration, resulting in the eventual
declaration of independence by 14 of the 15 republics
comprising the USSR, leaving only the Russian Soviet
Federated Socialist Republic, now known formally as the
Russian Federation (“Russia,” in short form). With the loss
of the ethnic republics in almost a single stroke, the Russian
Federation found its nationalities problem mitigated to
some extent, though the problem has by no means
disappeared.19 True, the percentage of Russians rose from
53-55 percent of the population to about 82 percent today.20
But there are still over 100 languages spoken in Russia and
over 100 national minorities, including Tatars (3.8 percent),
Ukrainians (3.0 percent), Chuvash (1.2 percent), Bashkirs
(.9 percent), Belorussians (.8 percent), etc.21
In fact, 32 ethnically designated jurisdictions had been
established within Russia by 1996. 22 The Russian
population peaked at nearly 149 million people in 1991 and
has been shrinking since, a trend expected to continue at
least through the year 2005, particularly among males.23 To
the extent that military recruiting focuses on ethnic
minorities to make up for shortfalls among Russian youth,
the problems of ethnic nationalism and language
inadequacy become correspondingly more important
because they can erode discipline and cohesion within
military units.24
It would be a mistake for Americans to attempt to find a
mirror image of their own diversity situation in the
nationalities context of Russia. But as issues of American
ethnic diversity are explored in subsequent chapters of this
book, it may prove illuminating to recall by way of
comparison the USSR’s and now Russia’s experiences with
their own unique brands of “diversity.”
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TOPICS FOR REFLECTION
In 1997, a leading Moscow foreign policy research group
reported that the Russian army was rapidly becoming a
threat to the Russian people and their government even
though it could not defend them against any foreign foe. The
study predicted that, unless appropriate steps were taken,
the Russian army would either “disappear as such, break up
into armed groups which will support themselves through
arms sales and robbery, or even stage a coup”—any one of
which could produce dictatorship or civil war.25 The
prospect of such a calamitous schism between the military
and the populace in Russia provides food for though for all
politico-military observers, regardless of nationality:

•

Political Leadership is Critical. Military reform
requires sustained political leadership, as the
transformation of the Spanish military following
Franco and reform efforts in Latin American
militaries confirm. In the United States, Congress
supported the executive branch in a decade-long effort
to transform the degraded Vietnam-era army into an
effective all-volunteer force. In Russia, however,
Yeltsin’s style of government militated against
reform. Yeltsin offered the Russian general staff the
most corrupt of bargains—stay loyal, and you keep
your perks and dictate the pace and substance of
reform. As many U.S. analysts of post-Soviet military
affairs have pointed out, a painful but necessary
revolution in military thinking has not occurred in
tandem with the drastic budget reductions.26

•

An Army in Transition Needs Popular Support.
In a time of troubles, a country’s military needs
widespread popular support to accomplish its
mission. By neglecting questions dealing with
military corruption and the treatment of
recruits—questions of urgent concern to the
public—the Russian army forfeited what remained of
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public confidence in it. In a country such as Russia
where large segments of the population were
impoverished by attempted economic reform and
where a declining birthrate often produced families
with only one child, the death of a son usually meant
far greater personal tragedy and material hardship
than was the case in countries enjoying higher
birthrates.

•

War in Time of Reform Is Especially Dangerous.
Three times in this century Russian rulers have been
undone by what were supposed to be “small victorious
wars.” The Russo-Japanese War of 1905-06, military
intervention in Afghanistan in 1980-88, and the
Chechen war in 1994-96 all discouraged efforts to
conduct reform. Afghanistan and Chechnya,
moreover, damaged the Russian armed forces in the
eyes of the population. Several decorated Russian
officers complained about sending “untrained kids”
into combat. The Russian army learned nothing in
Afghanistan. It repeated the same mistakes in
Chechnya that it made in the Hindu Kush a decade
earlier, and the resulting deaths of thousands of
teenage Russian conscripts mortally damaged the
prestige of the army as a national institution.27 A
recent opinion poll showed that 82 percent of young
Russian men did not want to serve in the armed
forces.

•

Anything Taken for Granted Will Be Lost. Senior
officers seem to have taken as a given the comforting
shibboleths of the Soviet period, failing to factor in the
impact of open news media on society and the armed
forces. In the Soviet period, billboards proclaiming the
eternal unity of the Soviet people, the glories of work,
and the eventual victory of Leninism were
everywhere. By the late 1980s, they had become
shopworn myths of the aging Soviet state. The cult of
military victory also had gone stale by the 1980s,
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meaning little to the generations born after the Red
army stormed the Reichstag. The military universally
extolled as the “school of life” under the Soviets is now
loathed by Russian sons as a hellish prison to be
avoided at all costs. The estrangement between the
Russian people and its army is now complete,
providing an instructive lesson for those in the United
States concerned with civil-military relations.
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CHAPTER 3
THE AMERICAN MILITARY
AND THE PEOPLE IT SERVES:
TOGETHER OR DRIFTING APART?
John R. Groves, Jr.
This chapter discusses whether there is today a growing
estrangement between the U.S. military and the public it
serves. The recent experience in Russia as portrayed in the
preceding chapter dramatizes the need in America for all
parties—particularly the military—to rebuild the bridges
between the people and soldiers when they are broken and
to strengthen them when they are weak.
FLYING IN FORMATION OR CHAOS IN 3D
When asked, most Americans will express respect for the
U.S. military as a venerable, honorable, and essential
institution. Service sex scandals in 1996-98 and the
recurring allegations of fraud, waste, and mismanagement
have done little to diminish a generally high regard for
American armed forces.
While many who join the military make it a career, a
large percentage remain for a shorter period followed by
separation and return to civilian life or continued service in
the Reserve or National Guard. In addition, virtually all
who remain in uniform for 20 or more years and then retire
with full benefits proceed to enter nonmilitary occupations,
often for periods longer than the term of their military
service. Thus it would seem that the military rank-and-file
remain near the occupational mainstream and collective
conscious of the nation, helping maintain a strong linkage
between grassroots America and its uniformed defenders.
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Despite these heartening signs, some respected
observers of the military take an opposing view, holding
that the military of the United States is becoming
increasingly isolated from the people it serves. They offer
the following considerations:
Bearing out the proverb, “Out of sight, out of mind,” so
long as the United States is at peace the American people
have increasingly less involvement with the personnel and
operations of the military. The result might be a declining
appreciation for the needs and costs associated with
maintaining an effective defense establishment.
In such a peaceful environment, forced to compete with
the nonmilitary social agenda of the nation for scarce
resources, senior military commanders may feel compelled
to speak out vigorously in ways that seem to grate against
the traditional concept of civilian control over the military.1
The American public has reached—or is perceived by
political leaders to have reached—a zero tolerance for
casualties in military operations (setting aside major
conflicts in which America’s existence or core values are
threatened). To the extent that the military feels driven to
seek funding for new casualty-negating battlefield
technologies, these expectations are perpetuated.
Domestic economic and social conditions are affecting
the composition of the U.S. armed forces in ways that
degrade national security. For example, attracting recruits
has become more difficult as our healthy economy offers
alternative employment to middle-class high school
graduates from which the majority of volunteers have come
since the end of the draft. With the consequent diminution
of middle-class input to the recruitment pool, in the future
fewer political and business leaders will have had military
experience. Moreover, recruits who man the future armed
forces may be tempting targets for the proliferating
extremist hate groups, separatist “militias,” and crackpot
fringe movements seeking to foment racial and ethnic
conflict within military units.2
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The growth of the “militias” is a particularly troubling
development, especially considering the significant number
of current and former military members in their ranks. The
factors behind their growth are complex, embracing feelings
of disenfranchisement from government and democratic
institutions; economic dislocation; and the growing
authority of extremist organizations among certain
elements of our society. In an ironic twist, the very military
that, in extremis, serves to protect the American people
from domestic violence, may itself become a tempting target
of extremist groups. Indeed, the continuing theft of
weapons and explosives from National Guard armories and
depots suggests that the threat to the armed forces is
continuing to escalate.
THE EFFECT OF A PROLONGED PERIOD
OF PEACE
Public support for the military surged briefly during and
following Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT
STORM in 1990-91. The almost painless victory by coalition
forces generated widespread expressions of patriotism. In
retrospect, the duration of patriotic fervor seems to have
been in almost direct proportion to the length of the conflict.
Public response was heartfelt, but the nation quickly
returned to business as usual. Indeed, President George
Bush, whose popularity soared immediately following the
victory, saw a dramatic reversal of support over the next
year and was defeated in the 1992 presidential election.
Though the warm glow of public acclaim died quickly
following the success of U.S. forces in the Iraqi desert, there
were potentially far more enduring effects on popular
perceptions. Compared to World War II, Korea, and
Vietnam, DESERT SHIELD was of extremely short
duration. The actual ground campaign lasted 5 days;
American casualties were light; and most American forces
returned home quickly. Moreover, while Reserve and
National Guard units were utilized, no maneuver forces
took part in the ground war. Thus DESERT STORM failed
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to test grassroots support for a prolonged and painful
Reserve deployment.
In sum, Operation DESERT STORM set before the eyes
of the American people a vision of modern war that was
remarkable for two reasons. First, it portrayed a war that
was resolved quickly and with negligible casualties.
Second, it presented to the American people a view of war
modeled on the computer games they and their children
play, in which smart bombs, precision munitions, and
stealth technology replaced the anguish, pain, and terror so
graphically associated with Vietnam.
The extent to which DESERT STORM may affect the
expectations of Americans remains to be seen. Senior
military and civilian leaders believe that in the future the
American people will have a lower threshold of tolerance for
prolonged, bloody conflicts. The war in the Iraqi desert,
therefore, may stand as a benchmark for the next
generation of Americans in making judgments on military
success, casualties, and duration of hostilities.
INCREASED SERVICE COMPETITION
FOR FEDERAL FUNDING
The post-Cold War period has seen a series of internal
inquiries within the military to identify the future threats to
the nation and to define military needs. Base Force, The
Commission on Roles and Missions, The Bottom-Up Review,
The Quadrennial Defense Review, and The National Defense
Panel were all created to make recommendations
concerning the composition of military forces necessary to
support the national security strategy. With Russia no
longer qualifying as a peer competitor, this process has been
complex and controversial. The period has seen greater
emphasis upon new technologies and a substantial
reduction in the active and reserve forces. The post-Cold
War period has been marked by greater pressure on funding
for conventional military activities within the individual
services.
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Compounding these developments has been an
enormous increase in the operational tempo of the forces,
producing a greater number of deployments of both active
and reserve military units. As a result of these
deployments—primarily in the categories of peacetime
engagement and conflict prevention—some have opined
that the military has lost its warfighting edge.3 Critics fail
to realize that this trend has been driven by a redefinition of
the main threat to American security. Nevertheless, these
trends may sharply alter the role of the citizen-soldier,
reduce popular support, and increase friction between
active and reserve components.4 For example, the use of
reserve forces in the Bosnian peacekeeping operation and
similar commitments entailing several months of overseas
activity duty during peacetime could lead to a revision of the
traditional concept “citizen first, soldier second.” Moreover,
in such a scenario, it could become far more difficult to
convince employers to accept drills and long-term
deployment of their employees in time of peace. This, too,
may generate conflict between the National Guard and
active Army over mission and funding.
A future marked by pressure to reduce military
capabilities is not comforting to military leaders. Might
these fears, as some have suggested, become so great as to
cause senior leaders to consider means that bypass civilian
control?5 The answer is, not anytime soon, if ever.
Nonetheless, if the military of the United States continues
to decline, new definitions of national interests may well
become necessary for citizen-soldiers, for their
commanders, and for the American people.
While it is inconceivable that our military could be so
diminished as to lose the capability to repel an invader, the
ability of the armed services to project power and enforce the
will of the nation upon our enemies is another question.6
Military planners have publicly declared that the United
States would be hard pressed to mount another campaign
like DESERT STORM. Furthermore, although a two
major-theater-war (MTW) threat remains the foundation of
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current U.S. defense planning guidance, it is even more
problematic whether the United States could fight and win
two MTWs simultaneously.
Pressure on military resources and operating funds will
continue to increase, while at the same time the
fundamental mission of the U.S. military to fight and win
the nation’s wars will remain intact. Several times in the
nation’s history draconian cuts in defense spending have
been mandated. As recently as 1945, the U.S. armed forces
were drawn down by nine-tenths of their manpower. The
present period of downsizing comes, however, as the Untied
States proclaims its status as the globe’s sole remaining
superpower. It also comes at a time when technology is
changing the role of the soldier, and at a time when the
traditional missions of the armed forces have changed.
THE TECHNOLOGY PARADOX
The Army is well on its way to providing not only new
weapons, but a wide range of personal protection devices to
the individual soldier. New body armor, personal medical
monitoring systems, and communications technologies—to
cite only a few examples—are in place. The goal is to provide
the soldier and his commander with technological tools that
minimize casualties and prevent tactical surprise.7
A critical question for the military is how this technology
will affect its mission and the public’s perception of the
military’s role. On one hand, technology can reduce
casualties and improve chances for survival among the
wounded. On the other hand, the consequent reduction in
casualties raises public expectations for further reductions
until the public eventually reaches the point of
zero-tolerance. This in turn places pressure on commanders
(and political leaders) to put casualty avoidance ahead of
mission accomplishment (and national itnerests) in
ordering their priorities. Since Vietnam, the American
people have not witnessed large numbers of casualties
among their armed forces despite the fact that during the
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same period, the military has been increasingly deployed
overseas by the National Command Authorities to support
national strategic interests. Since Vietnam, many of these
deployments have not involved armed conflict—and the
same pattern can be expected to continue.
The irony is obvious. Military deployments will
continue. Missions will be undertaken in support of national
interests as needed. At the same time, however, the
evidence suggests that public opinion will remain highly
concerned with American casualties and nonsupportive of
those operations that put U.S. fighting men and women in
harm’s way. Public support for DESERT STORM was
enhanced as the public realized that American losses were
far lower than expected. But American public support for
intervention in Somalia evaporated following the ambush of
a Ranger company that produced high American losses.
MAINTAINING MILITARY PERSONNEL
STRENGTH
Numerically, the membership of the armed forces
amounts to less than one percent of our population. Racial,
ethnic, and religious characteristics of the armed forces are
generally similar to American society. Most recruits (90-95
percent) enter the military with a high school degree or
equivalent. Moreover, senior enlisted members, especially
those remaining in the services until retirement, generally
maintain economic parity with their nonmilitary cohort
during their years of service.
Since the beginning of the all-volunteer Army, the
armed forces have been largely drawn from middle-class
volunteers, but that situation seems to be changing. An
important question for those interested in the military of
the next millennium is the impact of an all-volunteer force
drawn mostly from the lower economic strata. While the
U.S. Army following the Civil War and World War I was
largely composed of recruits drawn from the lower (and thus
less educated) classes, a return to such a situation today
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would bode ill for the egalitarian premises of American
society and the technological demands of the Army After
Next.
A gulf between the military and society is one that many
paramilitary organizations are eager to fill. Many of these
self-styled “militias” have a militant ideology, a strong
distrust of federal, state, and local government, and a
proclivity toward violence. Most see themselves as elitist
and chauvinistic organizations. Many are well-armed, and
some have boasted of possession of biological weapons.
While these militias do not now provide a danger to the
armed forces, they can be expected to thrive where the
military is perceived as not carrying out its mission. To the
extent that the military becomes smaller or loses touch with
the public, the growth of private, often single-issue, and
almost always anti-government groups is possible. The
militias pose a further threat of increasing polarization
within the military itself.
Since Vietnam, the military has successfully restored
high standards of professionalism within the ranks.
Cleaning up the drug problem, restoring racial harmony,
and the creation of extensive family networks are examples.
They have won a large measure of support in society and
indeed serve as an important bridge between the uniformed
military and the people. These developments have not,
however, eliminated strains between our society and our
military.
Indeed, strong but misdirected unit loyalties can create a
type of polarization posing potential dangers for the armed
forces of 2030. With the spread of permissivism in the
country, the military may increasingly come to view itself as
a “sub-society” with values that are “better” than those of
civilian society. This perception may translate into an elitist
disdain, viewing the greater society as being at odds with
the classic military virtues of sacrifice, self-discipline, and
focus upon the interest of the group before that of the
individual. 8 If this process continued, increasing
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detachment of the military from the society it serves could
reach alarming dimensions.9
Complicating the problem is the frequency of highly
publicized ethical, moral, and legal transgressions by
members of the military, from drill sergeants to generals.
Although relatively few in number, even a single instance of
dishonorable behavior attracts wide public notice, eroding
popular belief in the traditional exemplary standards of
conduct among the military.
One result of such scandal can be a siege mentality in
which loyalty to the unit is placed above prosecution of the
offender, with organizational solidarity becoming the
paramount good.10 This reaction leads to further isolation
from the public and—ironically—from the values the
services are supposed to represent.
CONCLUSION
Vietnam answered the question of whether American
soldiers should be committed to prolonged war without the
support of the American public. The answer was a
resounding no. A new set of questions now faces the U.S.
military—both active duty and reservists—in the post-Cold
War world. These questions derive from the broad problem
of how to employ reserve forces to accomplish missions in a
high-optempo environment, frequently on a sustained
basis, while preserving long-term support for both the
mission and the military components that carry them out.
For example:
At what point in a developing military confrontation
should Reserves and National Guard units be mobilized?
For what duration should they be committed in
conditions short of declared war?
Should they have a role in homeland defense,
particularly in dealing with the threat against the United
States posed by weapons of mass destruction?11

41

The foregoing are sensitive and profoundly important
questions. The answers that we as a society provide will go a
long way in determining whether the forces that tend to
separate the American military from the people it serves
will prevail. All national defense policy debate should be
tempered by a determination to keep the American soldier
and the American people together, for they are, after all, one
and the same.
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CHAPTER 4
THE U.S. ARMY AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY:
A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Douglas V. Johnson II
To set the stage for the various treatments of
contemporary diversity issues contained in the chapters
that follow, I shall present a compressed historical tour
d’horizon of the employment of black and other minority
soldiers in the American Army from the Revolutionary
period. Admittedly, “diversity” embraces far more than the
male experience. Certainly women did sometimes serve in
uniform in various capacities, but they were seldom legal
and always auxiliary. Therefore, without at all denying the
worthwhile contribution of women to national defense over
the years, diversity inquiries into the period prior to World
War II devolve essentially to ethnicity. In treating this
subject, I shall for the sake of historical verisimilitude be
using language taken verbatim from the official records. In
doing so, I mean, of course, no disrespect to any person or
group.
Many readers will recall Crispus Attucks (born 1723?), a
black man who became a victim of the Boston Massacre on
March 5, 1770. Considerable irony attaches to the fact that,
while he was one of the first to die in the struggle for
American independence, his freedom would have by no
means been assured even after the Revolution. He was not a
soldier per se, since there was no Army, but once the killing
began in earnest, the criterion for inclusion became—as it
usually does in such circumstances—one’s willingness to
confront the enemy and not much more.
In the New England states, free negroes were initially
enrolled without prejudice. That situation did not hold,
however, for Congress passed a law forbidding their
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reenlistment. That law remained in effect until 1776, when
white volunteers got really short again, and the Secretary of
War persuaded Congress to repeal the law.1 Black soldiers
were integrated in most units, but in 1778 when a general
reorganization took place throughout the Army, Rhode
Island consolidated all its black soldiers into one regiment,
the first segregated unit I was able to identify. Since we do
not know the details of that act, I am not certain
“segregated” as we understand the word today is properly
descriptive.2
While bigotry toward any group is always to be
condemned on its face, there were relatively few problems
with ethnicity in the Army in the early decades, at least not
in any sense that one could argue plausibly that ethnicity
acted against “good order and discipline.” Ironically, in the
late 1940s, Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall argued
against President Truman’s order to desegregate the armed
forces on the ground that integration would be disruptive of
good order and discipline and would thus reduce the combat
readiness of the Army as a whole.
In 1976, Robert A. Gross published a study of
Minutemen centered on Concord, Massachussets. In it he
notes: “No longer did young men of substance volunteer for
common duty in any sizable numbers. The war was now
being fought principally by landless younger sons, by the
permanent poor and blacks.” He continues with the
observation that eventually the town of Concord filled eight
percent of its quota with blacks. But he also noted that Army
service meant freedom for black soldiers; the Army
protected former slaves within its ranks, supporting their
cause in court against their former owners. Whether it
would have continued to do so when the demand for
manpower was lower, we can not say from this source.3
With independence won, the country embarked upon its
first downsizing of the Army, one that would have reached
zero had not several prominent voices intervened. After all,
American independence was not truly won until after the
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War of 1812. But the Army was reduced to a shadow of its
former self—718 officers and enlisted in 1789—never
having been particularly large in the first place.4 The Army
now undertook to protect the frontiers, initially shielding
the Indians against voracious, land-grabbing settlers.
Ethnicity was not an issue. But those hearty and
adventuresome enough to enlist died in the wilderness in
depressing numbers.
The Army swelled to 44,736 by the end of the Mexican
War in 1847, but only 6 years later it was down to 10,572.5
Of these, 8,000 were deployed somewhere—and we think we
are overstretched today!6
The periodic wars entailing accordian-like troop
buildups and subsequent drawdowns, the incredibly harsh
and brutal conditions on the frontier, the over-extension of
the force, the low pay, and the fanciful rumors of riches to be
won in the mountains further west all combined to make it
difficult to hang onto the troops we had, much less to recruit
new ones. With 4,600 recruits required to fill the ranks in
1853, for example, the Secretary of War in his annual report
said, “To obtain these at the prevailing rate of pay, and in
the present prosperous state of the country, can scarcely be
expected.” Sound familiar? Combining the lure of gold in
California (reputed to be responsible for 530 desertions),
desertions in general were running over 12 percent and
taken together with other losses required more than
one-third of the entire Army to be recruited every
year—one-third!7 Is it any wonder, then, that desperate
recruiters began to look at heretofore untapped sources of
recruit material?
Notice that so far I have not spoken of diversity in any
form—the official reports are silent thereupon. But in 1856
there is a curious entry in the Secretary of War’s annual
report. After detailing the continuation of the 30 percent per
annum loss rate, the Secretary states, “Reports show an
unusually large proportion of Americans among the
detachments recently sent to regiments.” So the dirty little
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secret begins to show its head. Most of the men who had
been enlisting in the Army were not Americans. What does
that mean?8
In 1857 we get a better glimpse of the truth. Rolls
showing casualties and decorations from combat with
Indians reveal the following names: Kuhn, Strobell,
Mueller, Weiss, Zinzenhoffer, Franz—and Rooney,
McManus, McKim, Dougherty, Sullivan, Duggan,
McCandle, Quinn, O’Donnell, McKay, McEowen. 9
Americans? Maybe in death, beforehand we cannot tell for
certain. They represent substantial minority groupings
within the Army of that time, but they had one
advantage—if they kept their mouths shut, they were not as
easily distinguishable as were soldiers of color.
Service in the Army was one road to American
citizenship. In addition, for much of our history, the Army
remained a steady employer for those unable to get work
elsewhere or for other reasons about which we may
speculate endlessly. The old explanation for Irish
enlistments was that “the mercurial sons of Erin” were
given to poetry and blood by nature, and Army drink was
cheap. In fact, ours is one of the few armies in history that
did not provide a liquor ration.
This manifestation of diversity had, to this point, caused
trouble only once. During the Mexican War, a group of
soldiers of Irish descent deserted and joined the Mexican
Army, forming what was known as the “San Patricio”
Battalion. We do not know the number of deserters in it, but
when that battalion was defeated in battle, those identified
as deserters were shot as traitors. The reluctance of Irish
Catholics to fight Mexican Catholics played a role in the
desertions.
How far religion might have come to be a disruptive force
was never answered, as the great and tragic Civil War burst
upon the nation within the next few years. The complex
intermingling of issues of slavery and preservation of the
Union is well enough known that we need not enter it here,
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but it is in the Civil War that diversity begins to take on
increasing importance.
In his 1863 report, the Secretary of War notes the
establishment of the “Bureau for Colored Troops,” meaning
that enough black men had joined the Army to create the
need for a separate management office. In his 1864 report
the Secretary reported that 58,301 colored troops had been
raised from within the rebel states. He noted further that
while in October 1863 there had been only 58 colored
regiments totalling 37,707 soldiers, by October 1864 the
numbers had risen to 140 regiments and 101,950 soldiers,
certainly impressive numbers.10
But there was also a sour note. The Adjutant General
noted that when black soldiers were first enlisted, they were
frequently consigned to labor duties rather than fighting.
He voiced his own strenuous objections thereto and insisted
that black soldiers be properly trained as soldiers and
employed as such: “The prejudice in the Army against their
employment as troops was very great; but now, since the
blacks have fully shown their fighting qualities and
manliness, it has greatly changed."11
There was a particular situation during the Civil War in
which ethnic diversity had a strongly negative effect. The
11th Corps of the Union Army was popularly known as the
German Corps, containing many soldiers of Germanic
origin who fled Europe following the 1848 revolutions. This
corps had the great misfortune to have been thrown into the
right of the Union line at the battle of Chancellorsville,
where it was a sitting duck for Stonewall Jackson’s force.
Jackson had marched his troops behind Confederate lines in
hopes of finding an unprotected Union right flank. By the
time he arrived, the 11th Corps was “protecting” that flank,
but it was totally ignorant of its mission or of any enemy to
its front or flank. Jackson’s attack caught the Corps
unaware and drove it from the field as it would have driven
any unit so caught. Morale remained intact, and the 11th
Corps recovered its balance and reassembled. Then it
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marched to Gettysburg. There, once again it was placed on
the right of the line. But even though the higher command
knew a Confederate division was en route to Gettysburg
from the east, no reconnaissance was made, and once again
the Confederates slammed into the unprotected right flank
of the 11th Corps and drove it from the field. 12 The Army of
the Potomac cursed those “damned Germans” liberally and
long thereafter. In truth, the Germans in that corps did not
fight badly at all, but they were bedevilled by their previous
failures, their lack of confidence in their commander, and
residual political confusions. There were sharp cleavages
between the old European aristocracy and the newly
arrived liberals who were ardent supporters of
emancipation—a good deal more ardent than most of the
Union soldiers whose principal identifiable goal was
restoration of the Union.13
We will pass over the terribly unhappy period of
Reconstruction during which the Army found itself
administering the southern states. This experience later
resulted in legislation forbidding regular Army personnel
from exercising any police powers whatsoever so long as
competent civil authority existed.14
Instead we jump ahead to the 1890’s. Not until that
period do the records finally begin to reflect the truth of
diversity in statistical terms. In the report for 1894, 27,531
people applied for enlistment in the Army. Of these, 7,817
were accepted. Of those accepted, 7,352 were white, 419
colored, 46 Indian. The record also notes that 2,891 of the
applicants were of foreign birth. While it does not report all
figures, it records that acceptance rates were as follows:
white 43.34 percent; colored 44 percent; Indian 74 percent. 15
In the following year’s report, the ethnic breakout becomes
more detailed, but we discover that the standards for
enlistment were made far more stringent:
By the Act of August 1, 1894, enlistments were confined to
citizens, or those who declared their intentions to become such,
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not over 30 years of age, and able to speak, read and write the
English language.

This is the first time those requirements can be found to
exist.16
The ethnic breakout per 1,000 recruits as set forth in the
1895 report is as follows: White, 927; Negro, 67; Indian, 6. ut
of the 927 whites, only 608 were “native U.S. citizens.” The
remaining 319 were composed of such nationalities as Irish,
German, English, Canadian, Swedish, Danish, and
Austrian, with Irish (95) and German (94) predominating.
Thus, about 32 percent of the incoming recruits were
non-native-born whites.17
In the 1896 report we find roughly comparable figures,
though it was noted that, for the first time in a decade, the
figures for both the Germans and Irish had dropped below
90. The Surgeon General included some interesting medical
data, reporting that while the average white soldier lost an
average of 12.6 days for illness, the average colored soldier
lost only 9.6 days. These figures led him to conclude that
“the enlisted men of the colored regiments are apparently
less susceptible to most diseases that the whites.”18
In the report for the following year, the white discharge
rate (for all nondisciplinary causes) was placed at 35 per
thousand, that of Negro soldiers at 26. Disability losses in
days per soldier per year were 13 for whites, 9 for Negro
soldiers.19 In addressing alcoholism as a major problem in
the Army of the day, the Surgeon General noted that the
Army-wide average was 29 per thousand, but among Negro
troops it was only 6.20 Though it may be in contravention of
received wisdom to say so, black soldiers by this time had
clearly established an enviable record of behavior and
reliability. Such revelations validate once again the cry of
every Ph.D. dissertation advisor: “Go to the primary
sources!”
Manifestly, despite the postive notes observed in the
foregoing survey, prejudice toward minorities of most any
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type has always existed in the Army and most other large
institutions. It culminated when General John J. Pershing
was forming the American Expeditionary Forces in France
in 1917 and 1918. Provided two division equivalents of black
soldiers, he refused their services and literally palmed them
off on the French. Pershing was adamant that he was going
to form an American Army and was not going to give in to
Allied appeals for men to provide individual fillers for their
units. Americans were going to fight as Americans under
American command-–except for black units.21 The French,
who had long experience with black African troops, were
delighted to have any soldiers. By and large, these soldiers
did as well as any, considering the gross training
deficiencies that afflicted the entire force.
It is unfortunate that attitudes like Pershing’s
continued into World War II. In a reprise of what we saw
during the early part of the Civil War, black Americans were
relegated in large numbers to stevedore units in the Pacific
theater and elsewhere. However, some made it into combat,
vindicating President Truman’s bold desegregation order
after the war. But as General Julius Becton has often noted,
even Truman’s directive did not result in full integration or
effective equality until after the Korean War—and some
would argue not until after Vietnam.
As we have observed from the annual Secretary of War
reports on recruit acquisitions, ethnic diversity is hardly
new to the Army. By and large, the Army has handled such
diversity with relative equanimity, focusing primarily upon
the ability of soldiers to do their duty regardless of anything
else. There have been and will continue to be incidents of
bigotry and discrimination. Such is human nature. But
there are few places in the world where such acts or even
attitudes are as fully and legally proscribed as in the U.S.
military.
It will soon be the turn of Hispanics to test the efficacy of
those legal proscriptions. In the fall of 1998, the census
statisticians announced that Hispanic teenagers were
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already the largest American minority group for their age
bracket, which will render them a prime object of
recruitment efforts in the very near future. Historically, the
Army has already experienced two waves of Hispanic
enlistments, once during the period after Cuba fell to Castro
in 1959, and again when large numbers of Puerto Ricans
were drafted for the Vietnam War. If the U.S. Army could
win the Civil War in which entire units spoke some
language other than English; if it could hold together,
barely, when a disproportionate number of its infantry were
minority soldiers in Vietnam, its most unpopular war since
the War of 1812; if it has been cited again and again, despite
its flaws, as the best model of social engineering in this
nation’s history—then I would hazard to suggest that it will
continue to do as well in the future. It will continue to look as
much as humanly possible beyond diversity issues. For
when it comes down to killing, which is ultimately why
armies exist, there is only one question that matters: “Can
that soldier be depended upon to do the job?”
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CHAPTER 5
DIVERSITY IN THE 21st CENTURY ARMY:
LEADERSHIP ISSUES
Joseph C. Jones
INTRODUCTION
The ethnic makeup of the Army is a concern of military
and civilian leaders within the Department of Defense and
Congress alike. Based upon Census Bureau population
projections, Hispanics will become the largest minority
group in the country by 2005, surpassing African
Americans. If residents of Puerto Rico are included in the
tally, then Hispanics will become the largest minority group
even earlier, by the turn of the century in fact. Immigration
and fertility rates are indeed changing America’s
complexion, and such change will inevitably affect ethnic
representation in the Army.
This chapter will address Census Bureau demographic
projections, Army demographic trends, societal and
military implications, and, finally, organizational
leadership issues arising from diversity changes in the force
of the future. Since my past research has primarily
concerned Hispanic representation in the Army, I will draw
upon this research in order to highlight that minority group
and its possible effect on ethnic representation in the Army
of the future.
DEMOGRAPHIC PROJECTIONS
In terms of national demographic projections, the
highlights below, providing insights to how America will
look in the future, are taken from the Census Bureau’s
population reports issued in 1996.1 Specifically, the report
indicates that:
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•

The white share of the U.S. population (non-Hispanic)
will fall from 74 percent in 1995 to 72 percent in 2000,
64 percent in 2020, and 53 percent in 2050.

•

Also by 2050, the black population will rise to 61
million, nearly double what it was in 1995. After 2016,
more blacks than non-Hispanic whites will enter the
population annually.

•

From today to 2050, less than half of U.S. population
growth will occur in combined black and white
non-Hispanic populations.

•

The highest rates of increase will be in the
Hispanic-origin and the Asian and Pacific Islander
populations, with annual growth rates that may
exceed 2 percent until 2030.2

•

Annually from now to 2050, the ethnic group adding
the largest number to the population will be of
Hispanic origin. Moreover, starting in 2020, more
Hispanics will be added to the U.S. population each
year than all other ethnic groups combined. By 2010,
the Hispanic-origin population will become the second
largest ethnic group.

•

By 2030, the non-Hispanic white population will
constitute less than half of the U.S. population under
age 18. But in that year, the non-Hispanic whites will
still comprise three-quarters of the 65 and over
population.

Inevitably, with such enormous flux in ethnic
proportions projected out to the middle of the next century,
especially among the under-18 age cohort, the military will
be deeply affected.3
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SOCIETAL AND MILITARY IMPLICATIONS
Though change is inevitable, the degree of change will be
based upon a number of variables. First, the level of
assimilation of various ethnic groups into American culture
will directly impact the demographic content of the military.
If Hispanics, who will become the largest minority group in
the near future, embrace the larger culture of American
society and assimilate into it, then it will be easier to recruit
and retain them in the active force. However, if Hispanics
fail to assimilate to a sufficient degree, they will probably
not readily enter military service primarily because their
language heritage will preclude them from performing well
enough to gain entry.4
Acculturation—the process of breaking down pluralist
group tendencies—was initially forced on Mexican
Americans during the 19th century. Since that time,
various groups within the Hispanic culture have
acculturated to varying degrees. The largest Hispanic
population is Mexican Americans, but the Hispanic
community is also comprised of people from Cuba, Puerto
Rico, and other Central and South American countries.
Each of these national groups carries different cultures and
traditions from their home countries. The Spanish language
is what links these diverse groups together, but to think
that all Hispanics are the same is folly. Therefore, the level
of acculturation and hence assimilation in the 21st century
will be a combination of highly variable inputs.
The level of integration of minority groups into
American society can also help explain what the Army’s
demographic content will become. Similar to acculturation,
integration goes one step further by bringing members of
the minority group into all aspects of the dominant society,
including its political, economic, and cultural institutions. If
minorities and immigrants integrate into society at higher
rates than at present, then they may participate in military
service if this service is perceived as being beneficial.
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The Army places a high priority upon training and
education, encouraging soldiers to get college credits
through evening courses and nontraditional means.
Education is seen as a means of advancing through the
ranks, since military and civilian education is counted
towards promotion points for advancement to sergeant and
staff sergeant. This view, consistent with Human Capital
Theory, is validated by many minority success stories
achieved through individual efforts and education.5
The force of the future will have to rely on trained and
educated soldiers to accomplish complex, technologydependent missions. The military already excludes those
potential recruits who score in the bottom 10 percent in
mental acuity. It considers quality recruits to be those
scoring in the upper 50 percent of the Armed Forces
Qualification Test (AFQT). As long as the military is able to
attract high quality applicants regardless of
socio-demographic variables, it will be able to contend with
the challenges of increased technology because it will have a
force with the mental aptitude to adapt.
A major concern for the future is whether minorities and
immigrants will qualify in sufficient numbers for service in
the military. While Hispanics today have only about a 50
percent high school graduation rate, the Army requires that
no less than 90 percent of recruits have a high school
diploma. If the Hispanic high school graduation rate does
not increase, a large proportion of this growing pool will find
itself ineligible to enlist.
When more Hispanics and other minorities do enter the
ranks, the Army must continue to support them by focusing
on quality enhancement. English language comprehension
looms as the most pressing problem for Hispanics in the
Army. The Army can tap into various existing resources to
support such soldiers. Through English as a Second
Language classes run by Army Community Services and
other computer-assisted educational programs presented at
Army Education Centers, any immigrant soldier can
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achieve language and educational improvement. If the
Army is serious about increasing the number of Hispanics
in the ranks, such steps are crucial. Minorities and
immigrants must not be made to feel like “second class
citizens.” At no time will the Army’s recruitment slogan, “Be
All You Can Be,” become more relevant than to minority
recruits of the 21st century.
As with any profession based on unique skills, it takes
time to grow senior officers and NCOs—normally 17 years
for a battalion commander or platoon sergeant.6 Minorities
have done well in attaining the highest ranks of the NCO
corps, but they are under-represented at the general officer
level. Unlike corporate America, the military does not hire
colonels and generals from civilian society. These officers
attain the rank through promotions after considerable field
experience and commensurate military and civilian
education. The Army must begin now to attract and retain
more minority officer candidates so that in the 21st century
ethnic soldiers will find role models and sources of
inspiration among the higher ranks.
INDIVIDUAL LEADERSHIP
The U.S. military moving into the 21st century will be a
far more heterogeneous force, capable of executing a
complex array of missions and duties. It will be a
multicultural organization that appreciates and values the
diversity of its soldiers. The multicultural approach differs
from a pluralistic design in that we work to increase the
level of appreciation for the differences associated with the
heritage and values of many different groups.7 For example,
throughout the year specific months are set aside to
recognize the presence and contributions of blacks,
Hispanics, and women. The military must value diversity
and demonstrate its positive attitude through these and
other programs aimed at celebrating and capitalizing upon
its diverse force.
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Beyond broad institutional programs and initiatives,
however, which we shall consider shortly, there is the
question of individual leadership by those in positions of
authority within the heterogeneous, multicultural,
ethnically diverse force of the next century. Following are
several suggestions for how to tailor one’s leadership
approach to the unique demands of the post-millennium
Army.

•

Demonstrate Commitment. Army leaders at all
echelons must have a commitment to diversity and
equal opportunity, a commitment that actively guides
leader conduct and human interactions. Such
commitment is the keystone to our entire value
structure. Leaders must recognize and accept that the
composition of the military is changing in the
direction of increased numbers of minorities and
women. Leaders must prevent issues of diversity from
adversely affecting decisionmaking as they guide the
organization toward mission accomplishment. In
their zeal to develop organizational cohesiveness, it is
important that leaders not forfeit the very real
benefits of increased organizational creativity and
problem-solving ability derivable from a diversity of
cultural inputs.

•

Get Educated. Americans tend to be ignorant about
other societies and even about subcultures within
their own society. Leaders should find out as much as
possible about the cultural backgrounds of their
soldiers. It is wise to use materials (including films,
books, newspapers, magazines, plays, songs, poetry,
websites, etc.) written by members of a relevant
subculture to complement “academic sources.”
Whether dealing with foreign or domestic cultures,
the leader must always keep in mind that he or she is
viewing others through a biased cultural lens because
of the potential for the existence of ethnocentrism.
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•

Be Open But Don’t Go Native. No one expects
leaders to be someone they’re not. While showing
interest in and warm receptivity to another culture is
appreciated, mimicking it is not, and in fact can be
insulting. Invitations to cultural gatherings or rituals
should be graciously accepted, but as a guest and not a
convert lest enthusiasm be mistaken for a patronizing
attitude. Leaders should not worry overmuch about
making honest mistakes in cultural accommodation
so long as their good will and honorable intentions are
clear.

•

Listen. Americans have a reputation for arrogance
and wanting to dictate to others. Get the mission
done, but hear what others have to say and be
receptive to alternatives. The mission and safety of
the troops obviously come first, but there are different
ways to “skin a cat,” and the leader must never
assume that his particular way was blessed by the
heavens.

•

Develop Cultural Awareness. An important part
of organizational cultural awareness training is to get
soldiers from the various cultures to honestly
share—before the assembled group—their prejudices
about different cultures in American society as well as
those of foreign countries, especially the ones to which
the unit might be deploying. Such public candor may
well evoke heated discussion, but so long as the
discussion cuts in all directions and is led
constructively, the unit benefits. Honest
communication is the best antidote to bigotry.

•

Set Up and Maintain Review Systems. These
should encourage continuous improvement in regard
to the leadership of diverse organizations—
scrutinizing the organization periodically to unearth
new problems and establish plans of action to fix those
problems. Such surveys, assisted by focus groups, can
63

help to identify and track issues of intercultural
tolerance and cooperation.

•

Empathize with the Disadvantaged. No leader
can truly understand or appreciate a culture until he
or she has considered it through the eyes of women,
the poor, or other disenfranchised groups in the
society. In reacting to soldiers’ breaches of cultural
decorum or any other lapse from the desired norm,
leaders in a culturally diverse organization would do
well to hearken to the ancient canon, “Judge not till
you yourself have walked in the sinner’s shoes.” When
a leader forces himself to realize that not all his
subordinates have enjoyed his advantages, he can
come to view them in an entirely new light.

ORGANIZATIONAL INITIATIVES
The previous section focussed on acts and attitudes of
individual leaders, primarily those at the lower echelons
who deal directly with soldiers. But it is also necessary for
the leaders of large organizations—e.g., an infantry
division—to recognize that they too have a vital role to play.
The higher commander—through his personal example,
articulated priorities, and organizational programs—sets
the tone for the entire command. If a high-level commander
of an ethnically diverse organization is indifferent to the
special problems posed by diversity, we can be absolutely
certain that such indifference will soon permeate all the way
down to the most junior enlisted leaders.
Following is a broad menu, by no means exhaustive, of
measures that senior commanders, acting either directly or
through organizational programs, can select to fashion an
enlightened command approach to diversity.8

•

Inform top leaders and those in positions of authority
that they need to be fully committed to equal
opportunity and appreciation of cultural diversity as
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organizational goals; obtain their commitment by
whatever means necessary.

•

Recognize equal opportunity and cultural diversity as
organizational issues and portray them that way to
soldiers and officers.

•

Assign responsibility for equal opportunity and
cultural diversity programs to top leadership.

•

Set goals and objectives, measure performance, and
employ appropriate incentives exactly as with any
other command program.

•

Stress the importance of promoting equal opportunity
and valuing cultural diversity in the mission
statement.

•

Set up special committees to advise top leadership on
diversity issues.

•

Offer training programs in support of equal
opportunity and cultural diversity.

•

Involve leaders at all levels in the design and
implementation of equal opportunity and cultural
diversity programs.

•

Stress that competence is the first screening criterion
for filling open positions.

Such measures as those above, plus others that might be
suggested by minority groups themselves within the
command, should go a long way toward ensuring a healthy
cultural climate. Senior leaders must do more than pay lip
service to diversity. They must infuse throughout their
organization a realization that diversity is here to stay and
that it must be effectively managed rather than simply
reacted to.
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The Consideration for Others Program originated at the
U.S. Military Academy can serve as a useful model for
organizations and institutions provided there is sufficient
oversight to ensure program objectives are being met.9
Already adopted by the Military District of Washington, the
Consideration for Others Program holds great promise for
inculcating in the Army’s collective consciousness a proven
blueprint for enlightened progress in resolving diversity
issues.
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CHAPTER 6
SYSTEMATIC PLANNING FOR RAISING THE
FUTURE FORCE
Michael J. Stehlik
INTRODUCTION
Will the armed forces of the United States be able to
attract and retain the human capital necessary to bring to
fruition the forces they are designing for the early 21st
century? We shall explore this question primarily through
an Army personnel lens focused on America’s military and
civil societies.
The Army is embarking on a major restructuring
endeavor as it seeks to bring Army XXI into existence over
the next decade and make the Army After Next (AAN) a
reality within a time frame extending out to about 2025.
Each of these armies will increasingly rely on technology to
dissipate the fog of war and increase the tempo and lethality
of combat operations. To manage this change, the Army
established the Force XXI process to guide it through the
conceptual development, experimentation, and fielding of
each of these armies. They are looking at human factors,
technology, and organizational structures.
Implicit in the Army’s overall restructuring process is
the question of whether the Army will be able to attract the
people necessary to bring these two armies to fruition
despite the fact that little is known about the personnel
characteristics required for each. In other words, the Army
is taking a “build it and they will come” view of the future
engendered by the unimaginable success of the
all-volunteer Army epitomized by the DESERT
SHIELD/DESERT STORM romp in 1990-91. But are there
trends in American society and national or international
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events rendering this personnel assumption increasingly
untenable? Is it possible that the splendid success of the
all-volunteer force of the past could be followed by
ignominious failure on the part of an all-volunteer force in
the AAN time period?
Unfortunately, there are several emerging indications in
America’s civil and military societies that future armies
may be increasingly difficult to staff. Moreover, the Army
lacks a sensitive prognostic system for providing early
warning of future personnel problems, thus increasing
chances for disagreeable surprises as critical manning
junctures approach.
PERSONNEL STATUS
For the ground service to evolve from today’s Army of
Excellence through Army XXI to the Army After Next
requires leaders who know where we are and where we are
going. To establish some terms of reference, let’s review how
the Army and the other services ended fiscal year 1997 (FY
97) in terms of their personnel status. In FY 97, the Army
arguably experienced its most difficult year for enlisted
recruiting since FY 79 as it added hundreds of recruiters
and millions of dollars to the recruiting effort while lowering
enlistment standards and posting the lowest1 fill of its force
structure in almost 20 years. The difficulties encountered
are not reserved for the enlisted ranks. Some classes of
helicopter pilot losses are running ahead of historical levels.
And the Army is not alone in its personnel problems. The
Navy’s surface ships were undermanned by as much as 25
percent in FY 97, a manning shortage projected to continue
until sometime in FY 99 due to critical shortages in highly
skilled enlisted sailors.2 The Navy was also experiencing
enlisted recruiting difficulties in the early part of FY 98. The
Air Force is having its own personnel woes as many of its
mid-career pilots are choosing to resign. The Air Force
predicts that they will be short at least 700 pilots annually
through the year 2000.3
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THE ECONOMY AND THE CURRENT PERSONNEL
CRISIS
Why is the Army specifically, and the services generally,
facing such serious personnel problems? Let’s explore the
most cited reason—the economy. We know that the overall
unemployment rate is at its lowest level in almost a quarter
of a century and that for 16- to 19-year-olds, the
unemployment rate is also at its lowest level since 1990. We
also know that the strength of the economy may be attested
to by other measures such as the rise in the commodity
markets, renewed public confidence, and possibly the
civilian-military wage gap. The wage gap represents the
percentage increase that would equate cumulative military
pay with cumulative civilian pay. From 1982 through 1998,
the civilian-military wage gap increased in favor of the
civilians every year except two. By 1998, the military would
have required a 13.5 percent increase to match their civilian
counterparts.4
On the other hand, we know that the Army’s recruiting
problems began in 1994 or earlier when unemployment
rates were not remarkably low, when the economy was not
as dynamic as today, and when the wage gap was not as
wide as it is today. Additionally, the Army successfully
recruited in both good and bad economic conditions and over
a period of steadily decreasing military wages relative to
civilian wages throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. In
early FY 97, as the magnitude of the impending enlisted
shortfall became apparent, the Army substantially
increased the value of educational and enlistment
incentives to offset the lure of the civilian economy. But even
these substantially higher incentives failed to attract
sufficient people onto active duty.
Does the economy offer a sufficient explanation of the
current staffing problems? Maybe. However, it is not the
only factor that might affect a young American’s decision to
serve in the military. Let us look at some of the other
relevant factors.
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TRENDS IN AMERICAN CIVIL SOCIETY
America’s aversion to sustaining a large standing army
during times of peace is of long standing. One has only to
look at the variable size of the Army over time and correlate
it with the periods of peace and war to begin to understand
the depth of that aversion. There are, however, two
exceptions to this pattern: the Cold War and today. During
the Cold War, the public was sufficiently convinced that it
was “at war” that it was willing to sustain a befitting
standing army. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the
government has failed to convince the public that there is
any credible threat—near or long term—justifying a
standing Army of 1.4 million plus people. Does this aversion
to a large standing military affect Americans as they
consider whether or not to serve in their military? We
simply do not know. But since this aversion appears to be
part of the American persona, maybe the Army should look
more deeply into the matter.
In addition to America’s aversion to a large standing
army, it is possible that community or selfless service is a
waning social attribute. In 1994, the Boy Scouts of America
conducted a poll among men and boys who had been selected
for Who’s Who. The results were startling. At the bottom of
the top ten attributes or activities associated with being a
good citizen were those such as “participate in charities” or
“volunteer time in the community.”5 Looking at it slightly
differently, Derek Bok in his book, The State of the Nation,
asserts that Americans appear to be less responsible in
fulfilling basic civic obligations.6 Others find today’s society
to be at odds with the military values of sacrifice, unity,
self-discipline, and teamwork.7 Still others assert that not
serving in the military was the moral thing to do once the
all-volunteer Force was created in 1973.8
Michael Sandel in Democracy’s Discontent asserts, “At a
time when democratic ideals seem ascendant abroad, there
is reason to wonder whether we have lost possession of them
at home. Our public life is rife with discontent. Americans
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do not believe they have much say in how they are governed
and do not trust the government to do the right thing.”9
Samuel Huntington in The Erosion of American National
Interests suggests that rising opposition to the federal
government may be a consequence of the end of the Cold
War.10 The Boy Scouts of America’s survey affirms that
males are dissatisfied with American society.11 Military
service requires a family’s most precious resource—its
children. Is it possible that parents, increasingly
discontented with their government and society, are loath to
surrender their children to military service?
In addition to a diminishing desire to serve, another
fading attribute in our postmodern society could be loyalty
to the “nation-state.” Samuel Huntington writes that the
process of “Americanization and assimilation”
characterizing past immigration has changed. Now there is
a distinct trend in which immigrants seek to retain their
national identities, in some cases retaining their ethnicity
as their defining characteristic. America may increasingly
become a multicultural regime where the melting pot ideal
is discarded and subnational issues dominate the political
landscape.12
Another daunting hurdle for future recruitment may be
the impact of technology on jobs, combined with steadily
increasing college graduate wage premiums as technology
drives up the cost of the human capital necessary to bring
the AAN into being. In such a process, several factors come
into play. First, information technologies are now reshaping
the workplace through such innovations as intelligent tools.
Intelligent tools increase the skill prerequisites of workers,
increase their effectiveness, and drive up their salaries. The
higher salaries strengthen the inducement of high school
graduates to attend college so as to qualify for the
technologically-based, higher-salaried positions becoming
available, thereby siphoning off young people who might
otherwise have been candidates for enlistment in the
services. If the services are to compete successfully, they
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must be prepared to pay more since manpower has been
made more expensive.13
Second, the economic benefit of military service relative
to college followed by civilian employment is continuing to
fall further behind, indicating that the Army may not be
competing effectively enough.14 While the wage premium
for those with 1-3 years of college has remained relatively
constant, those with a 4-year degree have seen their wages
grow from 140 percent to almost 160 percent of the wages of
people with only a high school diploma.15 RAND research
into recruiting indicates that there has been a substantial
drop in the numbers of students taking the Armed Services
Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) from 1988 through
1994. Additionally, the number of seniors taking the
ASVAB has also dropped substantially.16 Since taking the
battery, a prerequisite to joining a service, is voluntary, the
numbers taking it provide a good barometer of recruiting
prospects.
How might these trends combine to affect the Army’s
ability to bring the AAN force to fruition in 2025? First, it
seems likely that there will be a dilution of certain job skill
prerequisites in the AAN force owing to the proliferation of
smart machines. But it also seems likely that other
intelligent but technologically challenging tools will be in
abundance, thus requiring quality soldiers to use them
effectively.17 This bifurcation of jobs and skills in the
military will also permeate the civilian market.
Consequently, both the Army and civilian employers will
need and seek the same two quality groups among
employees.18
Moreover, there is research indicating that the
increasing college wage premium may actually be leaving
the Army a lower-quality pool of applicants from which to
recruit, since high-quality youth who previously enlisted in
the Army are now attending college.19 The lower ASVAB
test rates for seniors may indicate that they are sold on
college as the ticket to success. Further, their parents may
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be more sold on college and less enthusiastic about military
service as they consider the broad array of attractive options
available to their children.20 Cumulatively, then, the pool of
quality personnel will increasingly be pursued by both the
Army and other institutions. However, the growth of
economic incentives offered by the civil sector indicates that
the Army may have an increasingly difficult time luring
those people onto active duty.
Even as the impact of technology appears likely to drive
both the military and civilian organizations to seek the
same qualified people over the next quarter of a century,
there may be other educational trends that will further
increase the competition for quality people. Specifically,
despite the fact that college attendance is increasing, there
is evidence that proficiency levels among both college and
noncollege bound youth are not increasing. More important,
though, there may be more “inequality” in the quality youth
market than traditional statistics indicate.21 Consequently,
the previously discussed competition for quality youth may
in fact take place within a smaller pool of “quality youth”
acceptable to the military, civilian employers, and colleges.
If so, given the previous discussion of technology and jobs,
the Army will face even stiffer competition for the
high-quality youth necessary to man the AAN.
The last civil trend that may bear on military service is
that associated with values and morals. Clausewitz in On
War notes that the moral domain is among the most
important in war. But in American society, moral elements
necessary to a successful Army may be disappearing. For
example, the Boy Scouts of America survey alluded to
earlier concluded that “such values as citizenship,
patriotism, or social responsibility are assigned
considerably less importance by teens aged 14-19 than by
younger boys.” 22 With regard to older males, the survey
concluded that “the ethical and moral values of many men
fall short of the ideal and reflect a degree of cynicism about
society.”23 The military is an organization where success on
the battlefield demands acknowledgement of and
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adherence to the very ideals that seem increasingly to be
discounted in the pool from which soldiers will be drawn.
What are the implications for the military of declining moral
stock among the population? In the near term, the Marines
extended and toughened their boot camp, but even this step
may not be enough.24 In the long term, we simply do not
know.
Another indicator of the state of moral values is the
crime rate. How does the youth crime rate affect the Army’s
ability to recruit today? In 2025? Recently, there has been
considerable press discussion regarding the falling crime
rate.25 Others, however, suggest that this development is
really the lull before the storm. Even though the nation’s
crime rate has leveled off, the level of crime is still well above
historical levels and remains alarming. Crime victimized
nearly 42 million Americans in 1994—31 million property
crimes and 10.8 million violent crimes. Most of these crimes
were committed by men under the age of 25, usually
rendering the perpetrators ineligible for military service.26
Will the Army continue to obtain enough qualified
minorities when the crime statistics are projected across
racial lines?
TRENDS IN AMERICAN MILITARY SOCIETY
We have discussed a number of trends in America’s civil
society as they might affect the Army’s ability to bring the
AAN into being circa 2025. But there are trends in
America’s military society itself that also may affect the
Army’s ability to field AAN.
As mentioned earlier, the civilian-military wage gap
currently stands at 13.5 percent, but even this stark
difference does not capture fully the economic opportunity
cost to military couples. Increasingly, working wives have
become the norm in America, but military wives bear a
heavy economic opportunity cost because the position or
location of their soldier husbands often prevents them from
working at all or prevents them from developing stable,
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lucrative careers when they can work. This cost is estimated
as being up to 35 percent of a lieutenant colonel’s retired
pay.27 Thus, if the current civilian-military wage gap
computation were to include the lost economic opportunity
cost of military spouses, the wage gap would increase by a
significant margin. Making this economic situation even
more ominous for future military staffing is the fact that
over 56 percent of the enlisted force and over 70 percent of
the officer corps had or has a father who served in the
military.27 Therefore, if the serving military becomes
bearish on military service, it could become even more
difficult for the Army to recruit its future AAN force. After
all, fathers do counsel sons.
Charles Moskos contends that the decline of military
service as a gate for those bound for elite positions in
society—such as it was after World War II and the Korean
War—is the most important reason for the widening gap
between the military and the society it serves. Further
estrangement is adumbrated by the comparative lack of
military service within the current administration and
Congress.29 What is the impact on society when its elite does
not serve? We cannot trace out all the ramifications here,
but we know a priori that if talented young men and women
believe military service is irrelevant to their subsequent
prospects for entry into the nation’s social and economic
elite, then they will be much more prone to avoid it.
In summary, it appears that there may be important
social, economic, and moral trends affecting young
Americans as they consider whether to serve or not. The
most problematic eventuality appears to be that the Army,
colleges, and civilian employers will be actively pursuing
the same, and possibly dwindling, group of youth with high
technological aptitude. Also boding ill for the AAN is the
waning of civic responsibility and the rise of a multicultural
society in lieu of the traditional melting pot. The Army’s
knowledge of many of these trends is limited at best.
Obviously, with so much uncertainty about the future
availability of personnel, there is work to be done.
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GETTING A HANDLE ON THE FACTS
If the Army had a rigorous, methodical process by which
the “fog” of the future personnel situation could be
dissipated, then the task of bringing the AAN force to
fruition would not be as difficult. The Army does have a
long-range planning document called The Army Plan (TAP).
However, TAP is not an appropriate mechanism for
attending to the various imponderables. However, the Army
does have a proven systematic process that is specifically
designed to remove, or at least thin, the “fog” of uncertainty
in a tactical context. It is called the Intelligence Preparation
of the Battlefield (IPB). Fortunately, the analytical process
embodied in the IPB applies to the preparations for solving
any complex problem where numerous data inputs must be
successfully accounted for. Let us see how it can help us in
understanding and solving the problem of staffing the AAN.
The IPB is a systematic, continuous process of analyzing
the threat and environment in a specific geographic area as
it affects military operations. Specifically, the IPB

•

Identifies facts and assumptions about the battlefield
environment and the threat. This enables staff
planning and the development of courses of action.

•

Provides the basis for intelligence direction and
synchronization that supports the command’s chosen
course of action.

•

Contributes to complete staff synchronization and the
successful completion of several other staff
processes.30

The intelligence estimate is completed before any of the
other estimates are completed. It provides the facts and
assumptions driving all other estimates. The product of the
IPB is the basis of the intelligence estimate. The IPB
process identifies critical gaps in the command’s knowledge
of the battlefield. The commander, using the IPB process,
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identifies the initial intelligence requirements. The
command’s collection manager uses the results of the IPB to
develop and implement a collection plan satisfying the
commander’s priority intelligence requirements. The event
template identifies where an activity will occur. The event
matrix describes the indicators associated with each
activity. Finally, the intelligence synchronization matrix
depicts the collection strategy that supports the command’s
chosen course of action. The collection manager assigns
specific responsibility to one or more organizations to
monitor one or more areas of interest.
Intelligence synchronization is more than simply
ensuring that collection systems of various sorts are
operating. The collection manager directs the activities of
organizations and intelligence systems, receives the
information they produce, processes it, and then packages
and disseminates intelligence of value to the commander in
time to support his decisions.
ADAPTING IPB IN SUPPORT OF A PERSONNEL
SYNCHRONIZATION PLAN
Intelligence synchronization provides a framework for
understanding disparate data. If it could be applied to the
problem of future personnel, then it could go a long way
toward removing the element of contingency that suffuses
all discussion thus far. Moreover, it is the synchronization of
the data that will identify which trends or developments are
relevant and those that are not. To use intelligence
synchronization as a model for studying personnel requires
that we identify relevant areas of interest (RAIs) and
decision points. There appear to be five broad RAIs
applicable to our problem: (1) popular aversion to a standing
Army; (2) willingness to serve; (3) economic factors; (4)
military isolation; and, (5) moral, physical, and cognitive
attributes of society.
The first RAI—popular aversion to a large standing
army in peacetime—seeks to measure the impact of
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America’s historical antimilitarism upon the assent of
society in undertaking the necessaries to provide the
necessary personnel for a viable force.
The second RAI—willingness to serve—is directed to the
potential recruit rather than to society as a whole. This
measure may have generally been supplied by the Youth
Attitude Tracking Survey (YATS), but measuring
“willingness to serve” is actually far more complicated than
simply tapping into individual attitude. Willingness to
serve could also be affected, for example, by such macro
trends as the weakening of the melting pot ideal.31
RAI (3) encompasses all economic factors that might
bear on a youth’s decision to serve in the military. It would
measure the relative economic advantage (or disadvantage)
at discrete future years of civilian employment immediately
following high school, military service, and college. This
measure should be nuanced enough to measure the
difficulty of luring quality people onto active duty from year
to year. Additionally, the measure should address the
economic cost to parents of their offspring’s college
attendance in light of contributions that could be made by
institutions other than the Army. This RAI would also
factor in the size of the youth cohort, demand by civilian
employers, unemployment levels, and military economic
incentives (bonuses, money for college, retirement benefits,
etc.).
Military isolationism, the fourth RAI, seeks to assess the
impact on military recruitment and retention of the
weakening bonds of unity and common cause between the
military and the society it serves. This measure should
address, among other things, how favorably serving
military personnel view military service. Given the large
portion of the force that had fathers in the military, a
negative view of military service by serving personnel could
be extremely detrimental to the Army’s recruiting and
retention efforts.
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Finally, with regard to RAI (5), the moral, physical, and
educational attributes of society should be examined with
particular attention to how these will shape the raw
material of the recruitment pool. Such measurement should
lead to refinements in the focus of recruiting efforts,
adjustments of enlistment criteria, changes in training
programs, and other adaptations to the realities of quality
in the recruitment pool. The measurements reflected in
these RAIs should be linked to the relevant decision points
portrayed on a planning time-line out to the year 2025.
The first decision point would address strategies for
recruitment from the age cohort of 17-21 years. The
Recruiting Command and a number of research
organizations actively study this group. The second decision
point would aim at youth cohorts from elementary to high
school. It may be reasonable to split this group in two, since
research indicates that children older than 12 respond in a
markedly different manner to TV than those younger than
12. The last decision point would address cohorts of those as
yet unborn or not in school. At first blush it appear
ridiculous to consider this last group. However, the Army is
building a force over 25 years into the future, one predicated
on the twin assumptions that we will field enabling
leap-ahead technology and that we will find technologically
qualified soldiers to operate it. To make those assumptions
valid, we must plan at least 25 years ahead.
Lastly, to capitalize upon a Personnel Synchronization
Plan requires that the Army appoint a data collection
manager. Although there may be a number of organizations
that could perform this role, the Office of the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Personnel (ODCSPER) is an appropriate
organization to take on this responsibility.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The most often cited reason for personnel shortages
among the services is our robust economy. Upon closer
inspection, however, we find that there are emergent trends
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in our society and culture that over the long term could
exercise even more decisive negative effects upon
recruitment. The Army does not have an institutionalized
mechanism for adjusting to such trends in a holistic process.
Without such a mechanism, bringing the AAN to a
successful result will be distinctly problematic. The
suggested Personnel Synchronization Plan is a systematic
process the Army could use to assess the impact of the many
relevant social, cultural, and economic trends affecting the
various age cohorts insofar as their willingness to be
recruited is concerned.
It is therefore recommended that the Army undertake
the following steps.

•

Appoint a data collection manager. ODCSPER is one
logical candidate, and the Director of Personnel
Technologies may be the logical executive agent.

•

Implement an integrated process to synchronize use
of future personnel intelligence. A Personnel
Synchronization Plan (PSP), focusing on the five
relevant areas of interest, is one such process whose
concepts are generally familiar within the Army.

•

The collection manager should identify which
organizations can and should monitor each named
area of interest and then assign them the
responsibility to do so.

•

The collection manger should publish, probably
quadrennially, a document describing the future
situational data for personnel. R&D planners, force
developers, and training designers would employ this
data in the prosecution of their responsibilities.
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CHAPTER 7
THE HISPANIC MARKET: AN OVERVIEW
Ricardo F. Diaz
INTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses the Hispanic market component
of the United States Army Recruiting Command’s
(USAREC) FY 1999 Marketing Plan, in the process
highlighting some of the Hispanic attributes and behaviors
that influence their decision to join the United States Army.
The focus is on the strategies to be followed in the national
market.1
Hispanics are the fastest growing population component
in the United States and are projected to become the largest
minority by year 2010. It is in the best interest of the armed
services to learn the demographic issues associated with
this shift in the U.S. population and the impact of recruiting
from this group of youth.
WHO ARE THE HISPANICS?
The first problem is the definition itself. Hispanics are
those who identify themselves as being of Spanish origin,
regardless of race. There are, of course, individuals who
have chosen not to be identified as Hispanics even though
they otherwise would be considered as being of Hispanic
ethnicity. Hispanics can also be identified as a grouping of
ethnicities with a common Spanish language background.
The five major groups of Hispanics are Mexican, Puerto
Rican, Cuban, Central and South American, and all others.
Other problems with accurate classification of Hispanics
derive from the reporting procedures themselves. For many
years Hispanics were grouped as “others” in many of the
forms used by the government. It was not until recently that
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Hispanics attained their own “block” as an ethnicity in
many of the reporting forms.
The 1998 edition of the Yankelovich Hispanic Monitor
reports that Mexico is the leading country of origin for
Hispanics in the United States, with 64.2 percent of all
Hispanics. Central and South America are second, with an
estimated 21.3 percent, followed by Puerto Rico with 10.4
percent, and Cuba and others with 4.1 percent. “Others”
refers primarily to persons whose origin is one of the other
Caribbean islands. However, it can also refer to any other
Hispanic ethnicity not covered under the four major
countries of origin.
MARKET LOCATION
Hispanics, like many other ethnic minorities, tend to
concentrate in major metropolitan areas. Hispanics also
tend to remain for a good while close to the ports of entry into
the United States. The already established Hispanic
communities in such cities as Miami can provide sources of
employment and support to newcomers as well as sharing a
common language.
Information obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau
indicates that Hispanics of Mexican origin tend to remain
close to the border states of California and Texas. Hispanics
of Puerto Rican origin are primarily located in New York
City and the northeastern United States, while Hispanics of
Cuban origin concentrate in the Miami and Central and
South Florida areas. Hispanics of Central and South
American origin are primarily in the Miami area, but have
also migrated to New York City as well as Los Angeles.
Hispanic communities have been gradually established
throughout the United States in some of the other large
cities such as Chicago, Kansas City, and Seattle.
Recruitment advertising directed at Hispanics on a
national basis fails to achieve identification with the
separate groups and thus cannot accomplish much more
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than promoting the Army’s image in a general way.
Marketing and advertising directed at the Hispanic
community are more effectively communicated by using
geo-clustering techniques that will account for nationalities
of origin and their particular language colloquialisms as
well as cultural and social differences within the various
Hispanic communities.
A large proportion of the Hispanic population (80
percent) is concentrated in only 10 of the country’s 24
recruiting battalion areas. Ninety-five percent of
USAREC’s Hispanic recruitment comes from only 12 of the
recruiting battalion areas. These 12 are San Antonio, Los
Angeles, Phoenix, New York City, Southern California,
Miami (to include Puerto Rico), Houston, Sacramento,
Dallas, Tampa, Denver, and Chicago. Concentration on
these few areas produces the most bang for the buck.
DEMOGRAPHICS
Hispanic youth now comprise approximately 13 percent
of USAREC’s prime market (males aged 17 to 21), and this
share will grow rapidly. Hispanics have the traditional view
of “The American Dream.” Hispanic immigration, just like
that of others, is driven by the quest for opportunity. The
opportunity being sought is not only financial, but also
educational and social, if not for the adults then for the
children.
However, information obtained from the Department of
Labor indicates that Hispanics tend to cluster in blue-collar
or low-paying white-collar occupations. Hispanics are also
nearly twice as likely as whites to be unemployed. They
come from a larger-than-average household, with
lower-than-average household income. Data from the U.S.
Census Bureau indicate that the rate of Hispanics living
below the poverty level was 30.3 percent in 1995 and 29.4
percent in 1996. These figures are the highest of any
ethnicity. A number of factors—inadequate English, less
education, and lack of proper training, among others—can
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explain the Hispanic shortcomings in the standard of living.
The data also suggest that as children become older, they
are required to join the work force in lower-paying jobs to
assist in the sustenance of the family rather than pursue
higher education. Sadly, it has proved very difficult for
Hispanics to break this self-perpetuating cycle.
In the 1997 edition of the Yankelovich Monitor,
participants were asked to identify the best way for the
young to get ahead. Hispanics responded that going to
college was the best method. However, in a 1996 study, the
National Center for Educational Statistics (NCES)
established that Hispanics had the lowest expectation
among the main ethnic groups of attaining a baccalaureate
degree. Related studies by the NCES have established that
Hispanics also have the highest high school dropout rate
(30-35 percent). In an NCES study of Hispanic students
entering the eighth grade in 1988, it was found that by 1994
only 72.7 percent had managed to obtain a high school
diploma and 5.9 percent a GED; 1.4 percent were still
enrolled in high school, 5.7 percent were working towards
high school equivalency diplomas, and 14.3 percent were
complete dropouts. Though the dropout rate did not reach
the 30-35 percent level mentioned above, Hispanics still had
the highest complete dropout rate among any of the ethnic
groups in this particular study.
Moreover, NCES found that only 53 percent of Hispanic
high school graduates were qualified for admission to a
4-year institution. The qualification index used was based
on such factors as grade point average, senior class rank,
SAT and ACT scores, and curricular rigor. It is thus no
surprise to read of NCES’s finding in 1998 that Hispanics
were completing bachelor’s degrees only 32.4 percent of the
time, and that 36.6 percent of Hispanic students were
dropping out of college without any degree at all. The
reasons most often cited for these discouraging results are
lack of financial resources and family obligations.
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Such statistics would seem to indicate that Hispanics
have not yet achieved the “American Dream.” Though
education has been identified as the key to getting ahead,
Hispanics have the lowest educational achievement
statistics among any ethnicity. Fortunately, the Army offers
one of the best packages of educational opportunities of any
employer in the country. In view of the Army College Fund
and college loan repayment assistance, as well as
educational opportunities while in service through the
Army Education Centers, it would seem that the Army is
the right choice for many Hispanics looking to get ahead.
However, the truth of the matter is that because of the
restrictions contained in some of the incentives, and the low
educational attainment of Hispanic youth as a cohort, many
would not qualify for these otherwise very attractive
incentives.
WHAT DO HISPANICS WANT?
We have already mentioned that Hispanics have the
traditional view of the “American Dream.” However,
Hispanics remain firmly attached to their family roots.
According to the 1998 Yankelovich Monitor, the biggest
sources of satisfaction for Hispanics after family and home
are the acquisition of prestigious brand-name products and
shopping in general. More specifically, Hispanic needs and
priorities are categorized as follows:

•

Retro-acculturation. Hispanics are in a constant
internal balancing act between maintaining their
own cultural roots and assimilating into the American
mainstream. Hispanics wish to maintain their
Hispanic earmarks and are proud of their Hispanic
background. For the most part, they want to
participate in Hispanic heritage activities, and they
feel the need to maintain ethnic allegiance. But at the
same time, Hispanics have the desire to assimilate
and achieve success. Most Hispanics agree that
immigrants should learn English and accept the
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American way of life. They also believe that it is
important to be accepted by non-Hispanics.

•

Name-brand Leadership. A marker for economic
and social success is perceived as the ability to acquire
“brand” items. Generic products are considered to be
lower in quality, acquired only by those who have not
yet “made it.” The ownership of name-brand products
is seen as an objective testament that the person or
family who owns them is advancing and getting ahead
in American society.

•

Shopping Enjoyment. Another voucher of success
is having the wherewithal to examine all the shopping
options and decide which is the smart value. No longer
is the family forced to acquire the cheapest and lowest
quality item, for now, as the family progresses up the
achievement ladder, it can elect the product most
accordant with its aspirations and chosen lifestyle.

•

Technology Empowerment. Finally, Hispanics
feel that technology, as an extension of education, is
the marker of future success. Many Hispanics in the
United States are immigrants from third world
countries where very limited technological resources
were available to the population. Now that they are in
the United States—the very cradle of technological
prowess—they view their ability to obtain and enjoy
the fruits of modern technological advancement to be
a form of empowerment and status.

HOW CAN RECRUITERS CAPITALIZE UPON
THESE WANTS?
In our effort to recruit in the Hispanic communities, we
must portray Army service as a way of enabling Hispanics to
achieve their goals while serving the country. There are at
least two significant Hispanic needs that must be satisfied if
the Army is to be successful in this market.
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First, the Army must demonstrate that it is family
friendly. The Hispanic soldier must feel that his family will
be provided for and that his desire to be stationed close to his
extended family will be respected to the maximum possible
extent consistent with the needs of the Army. Recruiters
must participate in Hispanic community activities to show
reciprocal acceptance. Recruiters have the challenge not
only of recruiting Hispanic youth, but also of recruiting the
parents, especially the mother, convincing them of why
their son or daughter is better off joining the Army than
remaining at home. One of the ways to win over the parents
is by promoting the Army as a place to achieve personal
ambitions and acquire needed skills. The youth is thus
provided the opportunity to prepare for and be successful in
life. Army service also makes leaders out of soldiers, a trait
(brand leadership) that will distinguish former soldiers
throughout their lives. Finally, recruiters must reinforce
the Hispanic values of patriotism, duty, and work. By
affirming the Army’s high and noble standards, recruiters
sell the exclusivity of the institution. The uniforms,
equipment, and mission accentuate becoming part of an
American institution that signifies the best of what America
has to offer.
Second, the Army must be perceived as a smart value.
The Army must become a source of pleasure, excitement,
and social connections. It must also provide a comfortable
living for the family. But most important, the Army must
provide opportunities for future success, such as high
technology training that produces transferable skills. For a
youth to commit to a term in service, there must be a
demonstrated advantage over time spent elsewhere.
Finally, for those youths who have wandered without clear
direction, the Army must provide them the opportunity to
make up for the lost time and never-acquired technological
skills and education.
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TRAITS OF THE HISPANIC MARKET
Hispanics have the highest tendency to join the service
among any of the ethnic groups. As of September 1997,
Hispanic males in the 16-to-21 age group indicated a
positive propensity for active Army service of about 18
percent, compared to 16 percent for blacks and 8 percent for
whites.2
The 1997 Youth Attitude Tracking Survey (YATS)
identifies certain values that set Hispanics apart from the
general population in terms of response rates:

•

Money for Education

•

Parents’ Approval

•

Staying Near Family And Friends

•

Working In Hi-Tech Environment

•

Opportunity To Travel

The survey thus reinforces other reports of the high
priority on education among the Hispanics. It also confirms
the importance to Hispanics of family and high technology
jobs. The New Recruit Survey also confirms that Hispanics
are subject to relatively more parental influence in the
enlistment decision. In a similar vein, the 1997 YATS
indicates that Hispanics are less fearful of basic training
but identify “family obligation” as a barrier to enlistment at
higher rates than the general population.
With regard to Hispanic performance on the Armed
Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), it has proved somewhat
disappointing thus far. The AFQT results show that only
47.2 percent of Hispanics fall into Test Score Categories
I-IIIA, which would qualify them for better incentives and
enlistment options. By way of comparison, 67.4 percent of
Army recruits in FY 1998 scored in that bracket.3 Puerto
Ricans have scored significantly lower on the AFQT than
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other Hispanics, and lower in English competency as well.
Thus, though the Army provides opportunities that are
highly attractive to the Hispanic community, due to low
educational attainment many Hispanic youths do not
qualify for them.
SIZE OF THE HISPANIC MARKET
According to Census Bureau estimates, there are 2.7
million Hispanic youths 17-21 years old. The number of
males in this group is estimated at 1.4 million. The fact that
Hispanics have higher high school dropout rates and lower
AFQT averages than the general population explains why
they qualify for enlistment in the Army at lower rates than
the general population. Preliminary studies by the
Recruiting Command estimate that the number of qualified
Test Score Category I-IIIA Hispanic males in the 17-to-21
population in the United States is 171,144. From this
number, based on propensity-to-enlist surveys, we expect
42,444 to be potentially available. In FY 1998, 21,000
Hispanics were successfully recruited by the services as a
whole, of which 7,450, or 35.5 percent, enlisted in the Army.
GROWTH TRENDS
If all the services are currently recruiting some 21,000
Hispanic youths, then there remains a market of
21,000-plus individuals who are potentially interested but
are not enlisting in any of the services. We have to recognize
that these individuals may not be enlisting because of the
high quality of their records and the consequent lucrative
opportunities available to them in the private sector. There
may also be other factors discouraging these individuals
from enlisting that are not detected in any of the surveys.
The Hispanic market is indisputably the fastest growing
population segment in the United States. However, for the
reasons we have seen, the services may not be able to
depend solely on population growth as a source of additional
enlistees for the next decade. For Hispanics to be a
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dependable source of quality recruits, the Army and the
other services must actively involve themselves in the
educational remediation of these youths.
TELEVISION AND MUSIC AS RECRUITING TOOLS
According to the 1996 Teenage Research Unlimited
study, Hispanic teens, like the general market, watch TV as
the biggest leisure time activity. Additionally, listening to
music is very popular, but the Hispanic taste in music is
more diversified than that of other ethnicities. Hispanic
teens prefer alternative, rap, rhythm and blues/soul, and
Top 40 in that order.
A study conducted by the Nielsen and Roslow Research
Project in 1995 concluded that 83 percent of Hispanics
watched Spanish TV and could recall TV commercials 40
percent more accurately if they saw them in Spanish rather
than English. Advertising the Army to Hispanics in Spanish
is thus far more effective than in English. Also to be
considered is that Hispanic parents may not have the same
command of the English language as their children. If these
same parents are, in fact, major influencers, then
Spanish-language TV commercials would be able to reach
them much more effectively than those in English.
CONCLUSIONS
The Hispanic market is experiencing the fastest
increase in population, but it may be overstated because of
disqualifiers that prevent Hispanic youths from entering
the service. From a recruiting viewpoint, raising the
educational achievement of ethnic minorities thus becomes
all-important. Collectively, we need to reach into schools
earlier and encourage young people to stay in school and
take stronger college preparation programs.
The labor and educational statistics would seem to
indicate that Hispanics have not yet achieved the
“American Dream.” Lack of educational attainment is
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preventing Hispanics from qualifying for some of the most
desirable enlistment benefits and job opportunities. The
Army must revisit some of its definitions of quality as
applied to trainability and retention to ensure that we are in
fact measuring the right attributes and not limiting
enlistment opportunities for the Hispanic community
unnecessarily.
USAREC itself must undertake initiatives that will
enable us to expand our reach into the rapidly growing
Hispanic youth cohort. It must implement a targeted effort
to reach the Hispanic community in terms of selling and
explaining the product, increasing advertising exposure,
and reaching out to the community.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 7
1. Other than estimating the location of the Hispanic youth market
in reference to USAREC’s recruiting battalions and the Armed Services
Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) tester database for calculating
Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) projections, the discussion in
this chapter usually applies only to Hispanics located within the
continental United States, excluding data from Puerto Rico.
2. “Army Demographics” (Working Draft), Headquarters,
Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Personnel, Human Resources Directorate, dated April 6, 1998.
3. United States Army Recruiting Command, “Accession
Demographics (Includes Prior Service),” June 1, 1998, p. 1.
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CHAPTER 8
WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY
Myra J. Peterson
Despite the rapid growth in some ethnic segments of the
U.S. population, the female segment truly hasn’t changed
much at all in terms of its size, nor is there expected to be
any significant shift in the near future. Women have
composed about 50 percent of the population right from the
beginning and have remained that proportion with
remarkable steadfastness. Even following wars and famine,
the gender balance returns to even with remarkably little
influence or attention on anyone’s part.
In this chapter, I’m going to discuss the changes in the
Army over the past 25 years and then draw some
conclusions about what these shifts might presage for the
next 25 or so years. With regard to the demographic
composition of the U.S. Army in the year 2030, the best way
to look at where we’re headed is to see how far we’ve come
and note where we are now.
This examination could not occur at a more opportune
time. It happens that in July 1998 the U.S. Army celebrated
the 25th Anniversary of the All-Volunteer Army and, in
June 1998, the 50th Anniversary of the integration of the
armed services. These are two key events in our military
heritage that I shall discuss.
We are undeniably the best equipped, best trained, and
best prepared fighting force in the world today. But we will
be able to maintain that status only if we continue to recruit,
train, and retain soldiers of the same high quality.
In 1948, President Truman signed Executive Orders
99-80 and 99-81 which laid the foundation for fair and equal
treatment in the armed forces as we know it today. The first
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order opened the ranks to women, while the second cleared
the way for integration of our black Americans. There are
amazing parallels in the achievement of rights for African
Americans and for women. Both have suffered from societal
attitudes which suggested that their worth was somehow
lessened by their race or gender. But the Army has served as
the frontier for change in terms of its embrace of policies
that support equal opportunity, equal pay, and equal rights.
There is still uncharted ground ahead, but the Army has a
rich history of pioneering social change for the betterment of
our nation at large.
In fact, the year 1973 marked the beginning of an
unprecedented concept in service. The last man was drafted
in December 1972 and reported for training in June 1973.
All soldiers who entered active service since this date did so
because they wanted to. No longer were young men subject
to the draft and mandatory conscription. The benefits
deriving from this change have enabled our force to develop
into the strong, cohesive, effective fighting force that can
claim victory in the Cold War as its legacy. The Army fields
the highest quality force in its history owing to the gains
brought about by an all-volunteer force—and the
underlying success of the all-volunteer force rests with the
inclusion of women.
Once the Army acknowledged that they needed women,
they had to decide how to use them. In that evaluation, the
overriding issue was not cost-effectiveness but combat
effectiveness. In that context, other factors came into play.
First, women tend to be physically weaker than men, which
limits some of the work they can do; second, women were
excluded by law or policy from combat units and positions
calling for combat skills. These two factors reduced
utilization and assignment flexibility.
The tradeoff in the recruiting market of the early 1970s
was thus between a high quality female and a low quality
male. Within this tradeoff, the average woman available to
be recruited is smaller, weighs less, and is physically
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weaker than the vast majority of male recruits. And yet she
is brighter, better educated (a high school graduate), scores
higher on the aptitude tests, and is less likely to become a
disciplinary problem.
To phrase the question bluntly: Is recruiting a male high
school dropout in preference to a smaller, weaker, but
higher quality female erring on the side of national security
in view of the kinds of jobs which must be done in today’s
military? The answer to that question is central to the
decision on how many women should be used in the various
services. Sometimes the answer will be yes, and sometimes
it will be no, but the question continues to be relevant.
Wars are seen as embodying the very worst behavior of
humanity. They reflect our intolerance for others and our
desire to improve our own situation at the expense of others.
Wars are made in the name of religion, in the name of
liberty, and in the defense of the rights and values we hold
dear and feel are threatened by another society. War
happens because people find themselves in circumstances
in which they would rather die than tolerate. Paradoxically,
war can produce some positive results.
For example, war and the GI Bill seem necessary to get
males through college. In 1940, only 6.9 percent of young
males had bachelor’s degrees. This percentage continued to
rise until 1976 when it reached a peak of 27.5 percent and
then dropped to 22.3 percent by 1987. The rate recovered
gradually to 22.5 in 1994 and jumped to 26.3 by 1997. Note
that the 1997 rate is still below the rate of 27.5 percent
reached two decades earlier, following the end of the
Vietnam War.
Many of the advances in our society are tied to the
presence of women in public. The proportion of females ages
25 to 29 years old with at least a bachelor’s degree has
shown huge and continuing growth since 1940. This pattern
of year-to-year record-setting gains is almost unbroken. The
percentage of females 25-29 having at least a bachelor’s
degree rose from 4.9 percent in 1940 to 29.3 percent by 1997.
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The increases since 1994 have been particularly striking,
from 24.0 to 29.3 percent in just 3 years, which is the fastest
rate of growth at any time in the last six decades.
The steady gains of young women have carried them
past the slow progress of young men. In 1991 the proportion
of females with bachelor’s degrees passed the rate for males
for the first time. By 1997 the women were three percentage
points ahead of the males and pulling away rapidly.
The implications here are enormous. The educational
requirements of the labor market keep escalating. The
competition for the high quality, educated female is growing
and is likely to become even more fierce. But the rapid entry
of women into the labor market—and into the Army—can
create divisiveness.
Whenever the value of female service is examined,
certain issues inevitably surface. The data below were
provided by Dr. Naomi Verdugo of the Office of the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Personnel, Human Resources Directorate,
Department of the Army. She was kind enough to share the
results of studies she has either performed or collected that
bear upon the issues surrounding women in the force.

•

Pregnancy rates during deployments are the same as
before deployment, according to two separate studies.
However, pregnancy rates of soldiers are lower than
for civilians the same age.

•

On average, married service members have two
children; female service members have fewer than
males; dual-service couples have fewer children
overall.

•

The percentage of married enlisted men in the Army
is almost 60 percent; married enlisted females are
close to 50 percent. Of married enlisted females, 50
percent are in dual-service marriages, while only 7
percent of enlisted males are in dual-service
marriages. For officers, 5 percent of males are in
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dual-service marriages compared to 44 percent of
married women officers.

•

Although the percentages are close for enlisted single
parents, males outnumber females as single parents
because they represent a larger proportion of the
force. Of males, 15 percent are single parents, while
20 percent of females are single parents. Among
officers, 11 percent of males are single parents, while
10 percent of females are single parents.

•

Women have a tougher time meeting weight
standards. Age and childbearing only make it harder.
At the rank of E-6 and below, men and women
experience weight difficulty at similar rates. In the
officer ranks and at the senior NCO level, women find
it twice as tough.

•

Females fail to deploy for child dependency reasons at
a greater rate than males, but experience fewer losses
for indiscipline, performance, criminal acts, and such.

Beyond youth market propensity for Army service, we
attempt to track the attributes young people seek in their
future lives. We use this information to refine our
advertising strategies and recruiter presentations. The
1997 Youth Attitude Tracking Survey (YATS), which
included approximately 10,000 military-aged youth 16-24,
was based upon a 30-minute telephone survey started in
1975. Teenage Research Unlimited is a direct mail survey of
a representative sample of approximately 2,000 teenagers
aged 12-19. Responses were tracked to guide advertising
and marketing efforts.
In general, the Army is becoming older, more ethnically
diverse, more likely to be married, better educated, and
more female. But merely identifying these changes doesn’t
really address the impacts we can expect to experience
because of such shifts. It’s easy to see that some liberalizing
developments are to be expected, given the greater social
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tolerances we achieve with each successive generation of
youth. It is they, after all, who provide the ever-necessary
turnover of first-term recruits. Some of the impacts may
come about relatively soon—2030 may be too soon for some
of the others.
Our society currently finds the prospect of female war
casualties too repellent to purposely place them in positions
that have a high combat probability. That sentiment in turn
drives the combat exclusion policy, which influences the
number of female positions available more than any other
factor. And it is this sentiment that permits the
perpetuation of traditions and myths about the military
institution and women’s proper role in it. The struggle
against such traditions and myths was never about women
seeking special privileges or double standards. It was about
being allowed to compete based on ability instead of gender.
It was never about proving that women can do anything a
man can do, but about being judged as individuals by the
same standards as men in any job for which they can
qualify. It has always been about being allowed to pursue a
career based on their individual qualifications rather than
sex stereotypes and male norms unrelated to the job. It was
never about women’s equality to the exclusion of readiness
considerations. It was about the privilege of serving one’s
country without artificial barriers based solely on gender.
The mission of the armed forces is to provide the best
possible national defense within the funds allocated for that
purpose. The goal of the military personnel systems must be
to provide the right people to do the job. So the bottom line is
that no individual, male or female, should be allowed or
required to fill any job he or she cannot perform
satisfactorily in war for whatever reason. Gender is rarely,
if ever, the best criterion.
So the issue, really, is attitude and societal values. But
what will it take for our society to accept the necessity of
female service? Will the inability to recruit sufficient males
cause us to reconsider or will we look to the draft, doing

104

away with the gains made in the past 25 years of the
all-volunteer force? Are young men today so obliging that
they will accept the inequality of a male-only draft policy?
Can we sacrifice quality for the sake of our desire to shield
our female population?
These are questions that can be addressed only by
national developments yet unwritten, especially as they
play upon American public opinion. We are more likely to
have a female Commander in Chief before we have a female
Chief of Staff of the Army.
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CHAPTER 9
PERSON TO PERSON:
THE DIVERSITY CHALLENGE
FOR THE ARMY AFTER NEXT
1

Andre H. Sayles
INTRODUCTION
Organizations across America are today addressing
issues related to living and working in a culturally diverse
environment. For example, the Army is implementing what
is known as the Consideration of Others Program. This
effort was pioneered at the U.S. Military Academy during
the early 1990s, and was subsequently adopted by the
Military District of Washington. Moreover, diversity was a
curricular theme for the U.S. Army War College Class of
1998. In this chapter, I hope to encourage readers to adopt a
positive outlook on the value of diversity and reach an
understanding of how we can build on that value to the
benefit of both the individual and the Army.2
WHAT IS DIVERSITY?
The meaning of diversity depends upon both the person
and the context. In any group of several individuals, we can
expect diversity. Differences may be derived from an
endless list of possibilities, including place of birth, social
status, language, culture, height, weight, and age. All of us
have taken part in discussions regarding how soldiers from
the south may have a perspective different than soldiers
from the north. At times, we even make generalizations
about individuals from particular states or regions within
states. The same is true when we compare life in a rural
environment with life in the city. I mention these
possibilities because I want to encourage an understanding
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of the importance of differences in people. At the same time,
I suggest that we are all novices when it comes to working
with diversity issues. Accordingly, we need to do the best we
can to focus on the primary differences that affect the
workplace before addressing sources of diversity that have a
lesser impact on our organization.
Judging from my experiences in the Army, we should be
concerned about the primary differences in people based on
ethnicity, gender, and religion. Ethnic diversity issues are
often derived from cultural differences that can lead to
misunderstandings. In contrast, racial differences are
usually based on physical and biological characteristics.
Although two people of different races can have a similar
culture, we often associate minority races with a
stereotypical ethnic minority culture. In theory, racial
differences should not lead to misunderstandings unless
cultural or some other differences are also present.
However, minorities in the Army usually have a culture
that differs from what I will call the dominant military
culture. In cases where cultural differences between two
people are insignificant, racial biases can still hinder the
relationship. For convenience, I have lumped ethnicity and
race together. If we can make significant progress in
understanding the three general areas of ethnicity, gender,
and religion, then a second order effect will be an increased
appreciation of the many other possible differences in
people.
When we talk about diversity, we are talking about
relationships between individuals or between the
individual and the institution, especially where the
institution reflects the attitude of its leadership. Diversity
concerns are often associated with a minority population,
although diversity does not always imply minority.
Minority issues are derived from the concerns of or about
racial or ethnic minorities. Gender issues originate because
of differences between men and women. Therefore, when we
want to speak collectively about those who are most affected
by gender and ethnic minority issues, we should refer to this
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group as women and minorities. Although common ground
exists between gender and ethnic issues, there are also some
fundamental differences. If we intend to get to the core of
gender issues, we want to avoid lumping women into the
minority category. We have both minority women and
majority women. Therefore, minority women have two
overlapping sets of concerns. We should speak of women
when we refer to gender concerns and minorities when we
talk about ethnic minority issues. Currently, women and
minorities in uniform make up approximately 46 percent of
the Army and 52 percent of the Army NCO Corps.
THE SAME OR DIFFERENT?
Over the years, we have seen a number of approaches to
building diverse environments. For example, some of us say
that the best way to handle diversity is to treat everyone the
same. During the past few months, I have heard several
minority colleagues say that they just wanted to be treated
the same as everyone else. Not too long ago, one of my
favorite statements was that we do not have men or women
soldiers, we just have soldiers—essentially implying that
everyone should be looked upon as the same. Assimilation
refers to the cultural absorption of a minority group into a
larger body. This assimilation requires the minority group
to abandon its culture in favor of the organizational culture.
The success of assimilation depends on how well the
minority group can adapt to and become the same as the
main cultural group.
In some organizations we see an approach to diversity
that focuses primarily on individual differences. In the
private sector, this notion is frequently driven by economics
because it may be more profitable to ask a Hispanic
employee to sell the company’s products in a Hispanic
community than it would be to have a member of the
majority population go to that location. Instead of
considering everyone to be the same, women and minorities
are frequently thought of as being different. It may make
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good business sense to leverage differences and sponsor
programs that will prepare organizations for the time when
racial minorities will make up more than 50 percent of the
work force. The success of an approach that focuses
primarily on differences may depend on how well the
organization can provide an environment in which women
and minorities can be productive and continue to receive
promotions.
I am convinced that the most effective way of
encouraging diversity is to combine these two approaches
and consider people to be the same—but different. We have
to understand how people are the same and how they are
different in order to successfully manage diversity. We must
realize that our military culture has evolved over many
years. To every soldier who signs up, the Army is already a
work in progress with an established culture—a culture
that we cannot expect to change quickly. It is up to the
individual to make the adjustment to adequately conform to
this dominant military culture. For some soldiers, the
changes are comparatively minor. For women and
minorities, however, the required adjustment is usually
greater because of gender and ethnic differences.
If we recognize that a dominant military culture exists,
then women and minorities will conform to that culture to a
certain extent in order to be successful, but they will also
differ from that culture. It is not adequate simply to treat
women and minorities the same as everyone else. It is also
not enough just to look upon them as being different. If we
treat every person the same all the time, on the surface it
would seem as though we could never make a mistake.
However, the first problem would be that everyone is not the
same. The second problem would be that the objective of our
dealings with others should not be simply to avoid mistakes
or to protect ourselves. Similarly, if we only see others as
being different, our approach will create its own set of
problems. We will fail to create the best possible
environment if, for the sake of efficiency and good order and
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discipline in our organization, we blindly insist that
everyone is the same.
THE KEY TO SUCCESS
The concept of “same but different” will enable us to
continue to build effective organizations as the impact of
diversity becomes greater in the next century. We must
develop a clear understanding of how we are the same and
how we are different. We must complement that
understanding with knowledge of when individuals should
be treated the same and when they need to be treated
differently. We need to understand our organizational
culture and the extent to which we want those who are
different to adapt to that culture. If we ask for 100 percent
adaptation or assimilation, we are asking some individuals
to give up all of their past. If we ask for no adaptation, then
our organization has no culture of its own and it fails. This
balance between the individual’s need to align with the
organizational culture and the organization’s need to
recognize individual differences leads to success in
managing diversity. This balance of “same but different”
creates an environment in which each of us can excel by
working to our full potential.
WHY CONSIDERATION OF OTHERS?
Consideration can be defined as thoughtful regard for
others. It may be possible to respect another person, but
occasionally treat that person poorly. However, if we are
considerate of others, we will consistently treat them with
respect and dignity. Consideration requires full-time
respect for others, regardless of our personal feelings
towards them. When we adopt consideration of others as a
way of life, we will see that it spans the full range of human
interactions. We cannot treat others poorly because of
differences attributed to gender, race, ethnicity, culture,
and religion, or other factors such as alcohol use, hatred,
medical limitations, or personal opinion—and
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simultaneously be considerate of them. Consideration is a
philosophy for dealing with others that is independent of
circumstances or physical characteristics.
The ability to be considerate of others can be achieved
through sensitivity training. The objective is a deeper
understanding of others and oneself through an exchange of
thoughts and expression of feelings. This understanding
focuses mostly on how people are different. We can never
achieve perfect sensitivity. The growth process must occur
over many years. Sensitivity is like a curve that approaches
a straight line or asymptote but never actually reaches that
line. The farther the curve is from the asymptote, the
greater our likelihood of being inconsiderate. As our
sensitivity develops and we start to understand people
better, we move along the curve and get closer to the
asymptote. Eventually, we reach a point where our
understanding of differences allows us to know both the
meaning and the application of Consideration of Others. We
will continue to make mistakes because we can never reach
the asymptote, but our sensitivity will be elevated to the
point that we will know when we have made a mistake, and
we will understand that we must go back to the individual
and “set things right” at the first opportunity. Without
sensitivity training, we will make mistakes in how we treat
people and not realize that we have been inconsiderate.
Since we can never reach perfection, considerationof-others training must be a continuous process over the
duration of a career. Many years of working to understand
others will bring us closer and closer to the elusive
asymptote of perfection, though we can never actually reach
it.
WE NEED TO COMMUNICATE
Understanding others can be achieved through a series
of frank, face-to-face discussions. People fail to understand
each other because they do not communicate with each
other. They do not communicate with each other because
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they are separated from one another. The Army’s
Consideration of Others Program brings soldiers together
in small groups to facilitate communication and promote
understanding. Eventually, we learn to speak different
cultural languages. We understand how we are the same
within the institutional culture and how we are different.
Ultimately, we begin to understand how we must all
subordinate our individual views for the benefit of the
organization. We also begin to see when and how the
organization should respect our differences. We learn how
we each look upon ourselves as individuals, but also as part
of an organization. We are beginning to achieve our goals
when the institution looks back at us and sees the same
picture. Through consideration of others, we are not directly
changing the institutional culture. We are changing the way
people in the organization behave. Over time, this changing
behavior will have a positive impact on the institutional
culture from the bottom up. Moreover, an increase of women
and minority senior leadership could have a complementary
effect from the top down.
GOLD OR PLATINUM?
As explained by Major General Robert F. Foley and
Major Denise A. Goudreau in their article, “Consideration of
Others,” the Golden Rule is the essence of such
consideration.3 We want to be able to treat others with
respect and dignity just as we want them to treat us with the
same respect and dignity. The Golden Rule comes from
several places in the Bible, most importantly Matthew 7:12
and Luke 6:31. Similar maxims can be found in other
religions in either positive or negative form (e.g., do not do to
others what you would not want them to do to you). In
Matthew, the Golden Rule is positive and can be stated as
“So whatever you wish that men would do to you, do so to
them. This is the law and the prophet.”
The Golden Rule is a principle that we should establish
for our own guidance in our interactions with others.

113

However, we must be careful of how we interpret the rule
and, more importantly, how our subordinates view it.
Treating others the way we want them to treat us is valid at
the macroscopic level or as a general way of working with
people. For example, it makes sense to interpret Matthew
7:12 as a mandate to treat others with kindness because we
want others to treat us with kindness. It would be a mistake,
however, for us to use our own culture or our own
preferences as the sole basis for determining how we treat
others. For example, a Christian wants to be treated like a
Christian, but it would not be appropriate for a Christian to
treat a Muslim like a Christian. Similarly, a man should not
necessarily treat a woman the way a man wants to be
treated. If we interpret the Golden Rule in this literal
manner of treating others the way we want to be treated, the
Consideration of Others Program will not necessarily
change the way we approach diversity. We are born
knowing how we want to be treated and do not need training
to enable us to treat others as if they were like us. The literal
interpretation of the Golden Rule obviously has some
shortcomings.
FROM GOLD TO PLATINUM TO RAINBOW
Consideration of others is about understanding other
people so that we can treat them accordingly. The Golden
Rule should be interpreted as a mandate to “treat others as
you would have them treat you if you were in their place.”4
We can capture this interpretation in what I have heard
others call the Platinum Rule, and what I recently began
calling the Rainbow Rule. This clarification of the Golden
Rule can be stated as follows: “Treat others the way they
would have you treat them.” My metaphor of the rainbow
derives from the myth that a rainbow extends from a pot of
gold. It is also interesting to note how the colors of the
rainbow are joined together for a single purpose in the same
band of refracted light, but with each color retaining its
distinction or difference. This is exactly how we build
effective diverse organizations. Individuals must join
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together and be the same for the sake of the organization,
while the organization respects individual differences and
allows those differences to be visible.
The Rainbow Rule is a straightforward way of
understanding the importance of consideration of others. If
our objective is to “treat others the way they would have us
treat them,” then we must understand other people before
we can know how they want to be treated. The
Consideration of Others Program brings our soldiers
together in small group settings so that they can begin to
understand each other better. With this understanding, the
soldiers are armed with the tools they need to start treating
others the way they should to be treated or the way they
want to be treated. Christians must understand Muslims in
order to treat Muslims the way they want to be treated. Men
must understand women, and majorities must understand
ethnic minorities. Likewise, women must understand men
and minorities must understand the majority population. In
the latter case, women and minorities may have a head start
because they are already working in a majority dominated
culture and to an extent will understand that culture by
default.5 Their understanding of the dominant culture is
necessary for success of the organization and success of
individuals within the organization.
FROM TODAY TO TOMORROW
The Consideration of Others Program is important in
our efforts to create a better environment within today’s
Army. The program will be even more important in
preparing the Army for the future. As America becomes
more diverse, the Army will also become more diverse. By
the year 2030, minorities in America will likely increase
from the current 28 percent to approximately 40 percent of
our national population. This minority population change
will be largely due to the increasing proportion of Hispanics.
Women and minorities will play a major role in the Army
of the future. Their combined population in the Army will
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likely increase from the current 46 percent to well over 50
percent early in the next century. This implies that we need
to learn more about diversity now so that our growth as an
institution will not be inhibited by changing demographics.
Today’s efforts should encourage emergence of a future in
which diversity is an effectiveness multiplier instead of a
problem to be managed.
A GLIMPSE INTO THE FUTURE
The Army of the future will likely include small
warfighting elements that combine in a variety of
configurations, move quickly to anyplace in the world, and
connect through vision and voice to any point on earth. The
individual soldier may be outfitted in climate-controlled,
individual armor with protective defense against chemical
agents, small arms fires, and adverse environmental
conditions. Global communications via satellite will
complement regional communications based on wireless or
cellular systems enhanced by unmanned aerial vehicles. At
the touch of a button or perhaps in response to an
inconspicuous mental or physical gesture, the head-worn
display will provide the positions of enemy and friendly
forces, targeting information, mission status, and
environmental conditions. The individual weapon will be
able to automatically identify and target the enemy. The
land warrior will have no concerns about temporary
environmental conditions such as day and night. Likewise,
the ability to be extracted or resupplied at just the right time
will be taken for granted.
Although none of us can predict the future, the point that
I want to make about the Army After Next in this
abbreviated scenario is that our forces will be integrated
and fast-moving. In fact, we may not have a separate Army,
Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps in 2030. We may have a
single service or perhaps two services. Regardless of the
exact nature of the future force structure, it will demand
total integration of personnel. Our effectiveness in 2030 will
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depend on the extent to which men and women and people of
color and whites are interchangeable. My use of
interchangeable does not imply that women and minorities
will be assimilated into a single culture. It means that all of
our soldiers will understand each other and can make an
immediate adjustment to accommodate the person at his or
her side. Interchangeable also means that by 2030, women
and men may perform the same job functions. In today’s
Army, that would imply that women would eventually be
introduced into all branches. In a future scenario, the
integrated environment may make little or no distinction
between branches—if we have branches at all. Regardless,
the pace of conflict in 2030 will dictate that soldiers be
interchangeable. We will not have the time to stop a
fast-moving operation and raise the heads-up display to
check soldiers for gender, religion, or ethnicity before going
into battle.
WE MUST MOVE FORWARD
If our “mark on the wall” for 2030 is total integration and
interchangeability of service members, we need to look
backwards from the Army After Next time period and ask
what that means today. It means that we need to vigorously
pursue consideration of others in hopes that all soldiers will
have reached the necessary understanding of others by
early in the next century. We must continue making
available to women all Army opportunities. It is critical to
the Army After Next that we move forward from our current
posture on gender integrated training and fighting. If we
retreat from gender integration initiatives, the second order
effect throughout the Army will be an attitude that women
are a problem. We are ill-prepared to deal with such a
backlash. This negative attitude will not easily die. If we
stop progress now, it will take years to get back to the point
where we accept the critical role of women in the future. We
cannot stop and re-start the integration process on the fly.
When dealing with people, transitions take generations.
The year 2030 is only 31 years away. If we look back 31 years
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from today to 1968 and think about the progress we have
made, it becomes obvious that integration is a slow process
because for it affects the culture of an organization. We can
reach our target in the next century only if we continue to
seek out and implement new integration opportunities from
this point forward.
EFFECTIVE DIVERSE ENVIRONMENT?
I have written about the need to build diverse
environments by using the notion of “same but different.”
This concept accounts for the ways in which people are the
same as well as those in which they are different.
Organizations that expect individuals to totally assimilate
by giving up their own culture will always operate at less
than the optimum level. The same is true for an
organization that only focuses on differences.
Women and minorities can and must adapt to the Army
culture. Common ground is necessary in any organization.
At the same time, leaders must understand that individuals
need to nurture their differences. In his autobiography,
General Colin Powell talked about the student environment
at Fort Leavenworth as follows:
Nevertheless, we had made it this far up the ladder
precisely because we had the ability to shift back into the
white-dominated world on Monday morning. Leavenworth
represented integration in the best sense of the word.
Blacks could hang around with brothers in their free time,
and no one gave it any more thought than the fact that West
Pointers, tankers, or engineers went off by themselves. That
was exactly the kind of integration we had been fighting for,
to be permitted our blackness and also to be able to make it
in a mostly white world.6
General Powell describes his Fort Leavenworth
environment as a place where he assimilated for the good of
the organization, but was allowed to be different. Of
importance is the suggestion that others recognized the
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need for black students to nurture their differences during
off-duty time.7 This brings me to some specific examples of
the “same but different” concept.
WE NEED ROLE MODELS
To a certain extent, all soldiers are the same. This means
that men can mentor women and whites can mentor blacks,
at least to the extent that they are the same. The
mentorship that we can offer our subordinates will
adequately provide for their needs, regardless of gender,
ethnicity, or religion. On the other hand, a small part of a
woman’s mentorship needs often can be provided only by
another woman. The same is true for minorities. However,
the fact that a black soldier can get only the last 5 percent of
his or her mentorship needs from another black soldier is no
reason for a white soldier to avoid providing the first 95
percent of the mentorship. We all can and should seek to
satisfy the mentorship needs of our fellow soldiers and
subordinates, regardless of our differences.
A very important part of an effective diverse
environment is ensuring that role models are available to all
members of the organization. An organization that has
women and minority members should have visible women
and minority leadership at the highest levels. Our
environment should inspire subordinates to work to their
full potential and create opportunities for success as a
reward for that hard work. Women and minorities will know
for sure that they can achieve success through hard work
only if they have seen it done by one of their own. They need
to believe that they can be the same but different and still
make it to the top. They need to know that they can be
successful without abandoning all of their differences in
order to fully emulate the dominant culture. Women and
minority role models that go beyond tokenism in an
organization prove that stories about glass ceilings and
“good old boy” networks are not true. For the Army, these
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women and minority role models ultimately need to be at all
levels in all branches.
TOLERANCE PROMOTES UNDERSTANDING
Women and minorities nurture their differences by
sharing experiences with those who have a common
background. We should be supportive when women or
minorities spend time together nurturing their differences
as a break from many hours or days of being the same for the
sake of the organization. These opportunities to nurture
differences often give women and minorities the strength to
do a better job of being the same when the time comes to do
so. For example, when Hispanic soldiers are speaking
Spanish after work, they are not conspiring against the
organization. They are nurturing their differences as a
break from spending the work day being the same. The
identical principle applies to a group of women who have
lunch or dinner together.
The Consideration of Others Program will eventually
lead us to an understanding of such differences and the
impact upon our organization. It will become clear why a
black soldier in a stressful environment may want to share
quarters with another black soldier for the sake of having a
few minutes to nurture differences after duty. It has nothing
to do with segregation, but everything to do with
integration. We will understand how the soldier’s
preference fits in with mission requirements that may
prevent such a living arrangement. We will understand how
a woman’s approach to communications may be different
from a man’s approach. We will understand how men can
work side-by-side with women in a professional relationship
without fear of sexual harassment claims. We will
understand how majorities can work with minorities
without fear of racial bias allegations. We will understand
the adjustment that women and minorities must make in
adapting to the Army culture. We will understand why some
women and minorities have concerns about being left out of
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social networks. We will understand how being ignored
socially deprives women and minorities of an important
opportunity to sell their competence. We will understand
how some women and minorities feel that they must behave
like white males in order to be successful. We will become
comfortable with all soldiers because we will understand
each other.
CONCLUSION
As leaders, we are asked to establish a long-term vision
for our organization and to point our subordinates in the
direction of that vision. A realistic projection for diversity in
the Army is that we will need to achieve total integration
early in the next century. Our approach to diversity should
be based on the “same but different" concept. We will need to
expect our service members to become the same within the
organizational culture while the organization recognizes
that individuals need to hold onto some of their differences.
I can see three levels to my suggested approach to
building an effective, diverse environment. At the first level,
the organization recognizes the need for people to be the
same, while respecting their differences. At the second level,
the organization uses programs like Consideration of
Others to help members understand differences and learn
to treat others the way they want to be treated. At the third
level, the organization recognizes the value of differences
and makes use of the alternative perspectives to create the
best possible working environment.
For clarity, I will briefly outline these three levels. The
first level is a decision to buy into the “same but different”
concept. We must accept the argument that total
assimilation will never lead to the best possible
environment for our subordinates. If we ask our soldiers to
completely give up who they are in order to become the same
as our organizational culture, the backlash will eventually
show itself in the form of discontent and frustration. At the
same time, as leaders we must expect our subordinates to
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take pride in the organization and adapt to its culture. At
this level we simply want to recognize that there needs to be
a balance between adaptation to the organizational culture
and respect for individual differences.
After buying into the “same but different” concept, we
can move to the second level by beginning to understand
how we are different. Initially, we need to focus on the key
differences of ethnicity, gender, and religion. An effective
approach to understanding differences is already built into
the Consideration of Others Program. Simply talking and
listening in a small group setting will go a long way. We
must keep in mind that our road to sensitivity is always
under construction. We can never be perfect. As we work
harder to understand differences, we will become
comfortable with our daily interactions. We will understand
how others want to be treated. We will begin to sense when
others want to be treated the same and when they want us
to respect their differences.
At the third level of diversity management, we will have
accepted the “same but different” concept and have achieved
a basic understanding of differences. Eventually, we will
become comfortable with those who are of a different
gender, ethnicity, or religion. Our reduced inhibitions will
allow us to appreciate diversity. Those strange opinions and
unorthodox approaches to problems that come with
diversity will no longer be dismissed without discussion.
Instead, they will be considered alongside traditional views.
We will begin to value diversity and incorporate alternative
approaches into our ways of doing business. We will be
effectively managing diversity.
This approach to diversity applies to other organizations
as well as the Army.8 We need to understand where we are
headed, but know that we cannot get there in a day or a few
years. Our goal is to build an integrated environment in
which each person can work to his or her potential while
knowing that accomplishments will be recognized and due
promotion opportunities will be granted. Men, women,
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majorities, and minorities will better understand each other
and learn to work with each other to the extent that they
become interchangeable. Simply stated, we will be able to
treat others the way they should be treated.
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7. At the risk of expressing an opinion that is subject to controversy,
I want to share some thoughts on terminology. The black population in
America continues to search for an identity. About 30 years ago we
decided that we wanted to be called “black” after rejecting the given
names of colored and Negro. “Afro-American” was also used for many
years as an alternative to the use of black. Afro-American is sometimes
thought of as a more distinguished or official designation because it was
used by the Library of Congress and many other academic institutions
that wanted to start new programs in black studies. This use of
Afro-American still exists because there is no pressure to undergo the
expense of change. A few years ago, “African-American” became
popular. In theory, African-American implies descendants of Africa or,
more specifically, descendants of African slaves. However, a small
percentage of blacks do not necessarily consider themselves to be
African-American because they are not descendants of slaves. The
bottom line is that many blacks do not have a preference. Those who do
have a preference usually would rather not be called Afro-American.
Most new literature avoids this term as well. This means that it would
be safe to avoid the use of Afro-American while using black and
African-American on an interchangeable basis. Keep in mind that Army
literature mostly reflects the use of African-American, and that black is
a more global term that also includes those who are not Americans.
8. The “same but different” concept can be applied at many levels in
many different organizations. In an international setting, we would like
to see different nations treating each other with respect and dignity.
Understanding differences is critical to that process since respect and
dignity take on different meanings in different cultures. Our ability to
shape the international environment and spread American values
depends on our understanding of how other cultures are the same as the
American culture and how they are different. Effective diversity
programs in the Army will give our soldiers a better foundation for
understanding how to operate in the international arena.
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CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSION: APPROACHING THE ISSUES
OF RECRUIT DIVERSITY
Lloyd J. Matthews
The military, ostensibly a practical bunch, spends more time
peering into the future than any other branch of American
government or society.
Stephen S. Rosenfeld1

In the preceding chapters of this anthology, we have seen
detailed discussions of projected population diversity and
its implications for recruit diversity, expressed in terms of
considerable numerical and statistical quantification. We
have also seen some suggestions of accompanying problems,
along with approaches to solving them, within welldelineated compartments of the diversity phenomenon. But
what this anthology offers, ultimately, is not a clairvoyant
recital of every major problem that recruit diversity will
surely present to Army planners in the near term, or even
over the next 2-3 decades. Even more to the point, this
anthology does not offer hard-wired solutions to such
problems, since presently they remain potential and dimly
realizable at this early juncture.
What this anthology seeks to do is make tentative, but
reasonable extrapolations from current trends and analyze
the results with disciplined imagination to discern whether
difficulties are likely to surface. Through this effort we seek
to identify developing or potential trouble spots and set in
motion measures that avoid them, thus sparing ourselves
disagreeable surprises late in the game.
Much has been made, for example, of the Army’s
recruiting shortfall in 1998 and the declining high school
graduation rates and test scores of those recruited.2
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Obviously such developments are of concern and must be
addressed. For purposes of this book, however, we need to go
further and inquire whether in such developments we are
simply witnessing the fruits of traditional undulations in
the American business cycle (which affects military
recruiting through its influence on the availability of jobs),
or whether we are witnessing instead some new
development that could adversely affect recruiting well into
the next century. It is precisely this longer-range
perspective that Michael Stehlik takes in Chapter 6.
As part of a long-range analytical framework, it is
important to ascertain whether particular problems are
amenable to direct resolution by the Army itself, or whether
the means for resolution lie beyond the Army’s control,
forcing the Army to adapt as an institution. With these
considerations in mind, let us now review some of the main
potential problem areas that may emerge over the next
several decades and see how well they lend themselves to
solution.
It was earlier suggested that ideally the ethnic groups in
America should be represented within the Army in roughly
the same proportions as in the general population.3 Such
representation would cater to demands, in the name of
fairness and equity, that each group shoulder its fair share
of the nation’s defense burden. But during the post-World
War II era, we have never achieved such proportional
representation, and achieving it will likely remain beyond
the nation’s reach for some time. As Linda Gorman and
George Thomas have accurately pointed out, “The
composition of a volunteer military will reflect that of the
population only if all segments of the population have an
equal interest in joining and an equal ability to meet the
services’ eligibility requirements.”4 But neither of these
conditions is satisfied in contemporary America. Since
interest in joining the military often correlates with
economic class—the poor being more prone to join the ranks
and the comparatively well off being less so—and since
whites have a higher median income, we find differences in
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service inclination among ethnic groups paralleling income
distribution.5
Nor is the ability to meet eligibility requirements, as
reflected in standardized aptitude tests, equally distributed
among ethnic groups.6 It thus becomes apparent that any
successful effort to achieve something approximating
proportionate ethnic representation in the Army during the
all-volunteer milieu might require imposing quotas on
overrepresented groups or lowering aptitude test standards
for underrepresented groups. Since either of these
measures appears unacceptable on its face, the goal of
proportionate ethnic representation in the Army will
remain elusive for the foreseeable future. In fact, given the
correlation between economic success in the market place
and enlistment, the Army may be lucky to achieve and
maintain the high levels of educational attainment within
its recruit base necessary to underwrite the technological,
information-based force planned for the next century.
Of course, there are weapons to be brought to bear in the
Army’s campaign to recruit soldiers with sufficiently high
educational achievement, but most of these require money,
which in turn requires a cooperative Congress. We speak
here of such measures as reinforcing the recruiting
establishment, which would entail more recruiters and a
larger advertising budget; of improved enlistment
incentives, taking such forms as cash entry bonuses and
educational benefits; and of such career incentives as
increased reenlistment bonuses, military specialty bonuses,
pay, and retirement benefits.
Recognizing the Army’s present recruiting plight and its
retention problems, Congress in late 1998 appropriated
unusually large sums both to beef up the Army Recruiting
Command and to provide positive incentives for America’s
youth to join the Army. For example, a $3000 cash bonus
will be paid to almost everyone who joins the Regular Army,
regardless of Military Occupational Specialty chosen. The
combined Montgomery GI Bill and Army College Fund
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benefits have been raised from $40,000 to $50,000 for
regulars.7 Even more dramatic, a congressionally appointed
commission on service members’ and veterans’ transition
assistance recently called for a fully government-funded
4-year college education for qualified recruits agreeing to
serve a 4-year tour of active duty.8 The appeal of such a
program would be nearly universal. Even middle and upper
class families have increasing difficulty in sending their
sons and daughters to college because of the soaring costs of
higher education. An influx of enlistees from this source
would go a long way toward solving the Army’s needs in the
technological era, but the program would be expensive—an
estimated $400 million the first year—and one cannot be
optimistic about its prospects for passage. However, if the
national recruiting environment ever degenerates to the
point where the Army simply cannot man a satisfactory
force, it may compel the nation to reexamine the concept of
an all-volunteer force. Faced with the specter of having to
reimpose conscription, Congress might find the idea of a free
college education for 4-year enlistees a bargain after all.
In addition to recruiting and retention incentives to
entice qualified young people to join, another tack would be
for the Army to deliberately induct intelligent, but
marginally unqualified recruits with the intention of
providing remediation in basic education. In the case of
recruits who need to improve English language fluency, the
Army could administer basic instruction in English, either
before or as an adjunct to basic recruit training. Such
programs are expensive and inefficient, but if a true crisis in
recruitment materializes, remedial programs are a means
of salvaging high-potential youth who otherwise are
overlooked by the recruiting market.
Finally, as so compellingly argued in Chapter 3 by John
Groves, recruiting is facilitated when there are strong,
affectionate bonds between the Army and the American
people. It is an elementary necessity, no matter how much
such efforts appear to divert the Army from its “true
mission,” for the institution to build bridges to the people it
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serves and from whom it draws its sustenance and sinews.
From providing bands and marching contingents at local
patriotic events to cooperative interaction with industry
and academe as embodied in the Army War College’s
Strategic Outreach Program, the Army needs to keep
communications alive so that every citizen comes to know
the soldier and feel he or she is part of their own.
Washington Post writer Stephen Rosenfeld, on recently
being invited to a seminar at the Industrial College of the
Armed Forces, expressed the view that might have been
spoken by all Americans: “I like the military’s reaching out
to mix with civilians: It speaks of respect for an open
society.” 9
We earlier noted that it is not likely that ethnic
representation in the Army would ever match
proportionally that of the population at large. But a far more
important question raised in Chapter 1 is whether a roughly
proportionate alignment can or should be achieved in
frontline combat units. It is these soldiers who must close
with the enemy, kill him, and occupy his ground. It is these
soldiers who will inevitably take most of the casualties.
The automated, technologized combat soldier being
designed for the Army After Next will require a far higher
degree of technical trainability than he (or she) has in the
past. Moreover, the requisite technical qualifications may
rise even more for soldiers of other branches. Optimum
allocation of technological trainability among all the
competing branch constituencies will thus be a task for the
modern-day Solomon: there will never be enough of the most
intellectually gifted soldiers to satisfy every branch. The
percentage of blacks in the infantry today—15
percent—already corresponds fairly well with the
percentage in the U.S. population (12.2 percent).10 One way
to expand sources of recruits with higher educational
achievement would be to raise or eliminate female
recruiting ceilings,11 but this avenue bumps up against
male-female ratios dictated by the prohibition against
assigning women to units engaged in direct combat on the
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ground. This prohibition derives from Department of
Defense policy, not statute, thus it is presumably subject to
change. Before that could happen, however, there must
occur further change in the U.S. political climate. Though no
one can predict the political winds of the future, Americans
at the approach of the 21st century appear reasonably
comfortable with the idea of expanding roles for women in
the armed forces as a general principle, even nudging them
into a few positions where they might be called upon to visit
violence upon the enemy and suffer it in return. 12 But
Americans appear determined to spare women the mortal
embrace of tooth-to-tooth, nail-to-nail, breath-to-breath
clashes with enemy warriors. Though some proponents of
removing all gender-based combat exclusions sincerely
believe that war of the future will be sanitized and
bowdlerized, largely a matter of sitting at the computer and
pushing buttons, Americans instinctively feel that war in its
ultimate expressions will remain the nasty, brutish,
masculine horror it was in the world of Homer, where fierce
Achilles slew Hector on the bloody fields of Troy.
As we reflect over the preceding nine chapters, it
becomes clear that this anthology, dealing as it does with
the hazy future, raises far more questions than it answers.
But this is all to the good, because by raising questions and
sensitizing us to potential roadblocks that may lie along the
road to our future Army. These chapters equip us to
anticipate and deal with problems before they arise. Despite
the contingent nature of much of the previous discussion,
one premise embedded there remains clear, true, and
unchallengeable: While today’s Army will design and build
the Army After Next, it is the individual men and women
inhabiting that Army who will have to make it work. In
deflecting our focus from the Army as an institution to the
individual soldier, Andre Sayles in Chapter 9 makes clear
that managing diversity in the Army is as much a people
problem as a recruiting problem. If Army leaders fail to heed
Sayles’ eloquent plea to inculcate in the members of our
force an understanding and acceptance of human
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differences, then all our zealous recruiting, our vaunted
technology, and our farseeing doctrine and force structure
will ultimately come to naught.
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